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SUMMARY
It has become increasingly difficult in Canada to gain and sustain public acceptance of energy 
projects. Increased levels of protest, combined with traditional media and social media coverage of 
opposition, combine to suggest decreased public acceptance of energy projects. Decision-makers 
have responded accordingly, and a variety of energy projects have either been delayed or put on 
hold indefinitely. This is true for both conventional and renewable energy projects and in many 
different regions across the country. A number of proposed energy projects have recently faced 
opposition from various stakeholder groups. For instance, the decision of the Joint Review Panel for 
the Northern Gateway Pipeline is being challenged in Canada’s court system. First Nations groups 
have issued an ultimatum to the Federal Government that it must choose between Site C (a proposed 
hydro dam) and liquefied natural gas development in B.C. Rapid expansion of wind energy projects 
in Ontario has engendered lengthy and costly appeals and the rise of an anti-wind social movement. 
In Nova Scotia, tidal energy development is being positioned as a new renewable energy option; 
gaining public acceptance is critical in light of recent opposition to wind energy development. As 
these experiences suggest, not only has the regulatory process become more contentious, but also 
an apparently new concept — social licence — has had popular appeal. 
This white paper reports on the results of a year-long interdisciplinary collaboration aimed at 
identifying and summarizing extant research regarding social licence and related concepts, with a 
particular emphasis on understanding its implications for public acceptance of energy projects in 
Canada, and their related regulatory processes. In particular, this research addressed the following 
questions:
1. What is the history and scope of the term ‘social licence’, both in the context of energy project 
development and more generally? What are the strengths and limitations of this term? How 
does it help or hinder energy policy, regulatory debates and decision-making?
2. What are the similarities and differences between the notion of social licence and established 
concepts and other concepts or frameworks?
3. From the standpoint of public acceptance of energy projects, is Canada’s regulatory system 
broken? From whose perspective? And what alternatives might be considered?
4. What are barriers to, and enablers of a licence within the regulatory process — legal, social or 
otherwise?
5. What role does social licence play in the larger picture: How valid is the concept of social 
licence? Can social licence actually stop a project, or determine the outcome of an election? 
Does it create a valuable dialogue about a project? When opposition to projects leads to the 
arrest of people breaching an injunction or violent confrontations, what role can social licence 
play in promoting an alternative approach? 
In addition to a comprehensive look at the concepts of public acceptance and social licence and 
their applications to Canada, this white paper arrives at certain conclusions (Section 5) and makes 
recommendations (Section 6) for improving Canada’s regulatory systems and improving public 
confidence in Canada’s various energy-related regulatory agencies. For instance, as the federal 
government embarks on its agenda to amend the regulatory process, the research presented here 
can inform how the government can best carry out its mandate of reform while balancing the 
economic, environmental, political, social, and security-related issues pertinent to regulators, federal 
and provincial governments, industry, First Nations, environmental groups and the general public. 
The appeal of the term “social licence” derives from the inclusivity and equitability that it seems to 
imply. But populist pressure for increased voice and regulatory or judicial intervention, arising out of 
a sense of disaffection or disenfranchisement, is hardly a novel phenomenon: historical context and 
the lessons learned therefrom are essential in evaluating the idea and situating the debate within a 
meaningful framework. 
Social licence entails an additional layer of ‘regulation’, albeit an amorphous one. A central lesson 
of the 20th century experience is that regulation comes at a cost, and that excessive regulation 
and intervention can lead to paralysis and ‘government failure’. The implication is that regulation 
should be relied upon where it is necessary, and should be implemented in sensible ways. One of 
the conclusions of this report is that public trust and confidence can be enhanced by rationalizing 
existing regulatory vehicles to reduce the common perception that decisions are sometimes 
politically motivated and ensuring that decisions are made at the right levels of government. 
The institutionalization of social licence also has identifiable risks. It is likely to increase incentives for 
“rent-seeking behaviour.” The threat of veto, or even obstruction, endows the affected group with 
leverage that can result in extraction of rents that are disproportionate to impacts. It also increases 
regulatory and political uncertainty associated with a given project, discouraging investment, or 
requiring returns higher than are merited by the inherent riskiness of the proposed undertaking. 
The term “social licence” needs to be further analyzed, and, if used, used with care. The concept 
originated in the mining sector as the “social licence to operate,” and as the concept has migrated to 
the energy sector, it appears to have broadened in scope so that its meaning has become unclear, 
amorphous and confusing. Other terms such as “acceptance,” “support” or “public confidence” may 
be more appropriate in the energy sphere. Regulators, policy-makers and politicians should refrain 
from the use of these terms without a clear understanding of their implications.
Our specific recommendations include:
1. Governmental Coordination. Greater coordination of regulatory processes between the federal 
and provincial governments is required and should be directed towards enhancing beneficial 
outcomes for all affected stakeholders (Section 6.1).
2. Stakeholder Engagement. A consistent, transparent and rigorous system for identifying and 
reaching out to stakeholders is essential to regulatory efficiency and efficacy (Section 6.2). 
3. Social Licence as a Concept. When it comes to energy development, the term “social licence” 
needs to be further analyzed, and, if used, used with care (Section 6.3).
4. First Nations. The federal and provincial governments should take ownership of this duty to 
consult and ensure that it is done in a comprehensive manner that has been set out by both 
domestic and international law (Section 6.4).
5. Changes to the NEB Act. An independent review of the changes to the NEB Act regarding time 
to consult and the list of those who can be consulted should be undertaken to ensure the NEB 
is unconstrained in its ability to regulate appropriately and has public confidence in its mandate 
and decisions (Section 6.5).
6. Make Broader Use of Information Gained during Assessment Processes. Energy regulators 
should consider mechanisms to report recurring concerns that are outside of the scope of their 
mandate (Section 6.6). 
7. Compliance after Project Approval. There is a need for publicly available, timely and relevant 
data relating to the compliance and post-approval status of projects. Data should be placed on 
a government portal to increase accessibility to stakeholders (Section 6.7).
8. Cross-Examination in Regulatory Hearings. The extensiveness of permitted cross-examination, 
and indeed the entire regulatory proceeding, needs to be proportionate to the magnitude of the 
impacts of the ultimate decision (Section 6.8).
11. INTRODUCTION
Few would argue that there is increased public interest in energy projects in Canada. What 
is open for debate is whether this increased public interest is associated with lower public 
acceptance1 of the energy projects in question, and decreased trust of the regulator and the 
regulatory processes governing approval or denial of projects. Certainly, reports of project 
protests,2 court challenges of regulatory decisions,3 increased use of terms such as “social 
licence” and political pronouncements on the value (or lack thereof) of energy projects, 
all give the impression that there is a lack of public acceptance, and that this lack implies 
something may be broken with regard to Canada’s regulatory system. Moreover, statements 
by Canadian politicians suggesting Canadians themselves do not trust the regulatory 
process underscore the importance of examining this topic.4
The goal of this white paper is to address the question: “When it comes to public 
acceptance of energy projects, is Canada’s regulatory system broken?” This is not an easy 
or simple question to answer, as we must first attempt to define both what is meant by 
public acceptance and how it is measured, as well as to define the criteria for assessing 
“brokenness” of the regulatory system. We offer three alternative arguments on the state 
of the regulatory process — broken, not broken, and should be improved — to explore 
all sides of the issue. The objective is not to make a definitive statement on the state of 
Canada’s regulatory system, but to explore the recent trends in energy project development 
and regulation, and where public policy can be improved.
The publication of this paper is especially timely as the new federal government has 
committed to modernizing the regulatory process, notably pipeline review processes at the 
National Energy Board (NEB) and environmental assessment processes for natural resource 
projects. The Minister of Natural Resources’ 2015 mandate letter stipulates that the minister 
shall work with other relevant ministers on Canada’s environmental assessment processes 
to “regain public trust and introduce new, fair processes” with particular regard for “robust 
oversight” and “decisions [that] are based on science, facts and evidence,” ensuring citizen, 
indigenous group and expert participation, and reducing environmental impacts [123]. The 
minister’s mandate with respect to the NEB is “to ensure that [the NEB’s] composition 
reflects regional views and has sufficient expertise in fields such as environmental science, 
community development and indigenous traditional knowledge” [123]. 
1 Other terms commonly used include “social licence,” “social acceptance” and “acceptabilité sociale.” In this paper, we will 
use the various terms interchangeably. We recognize that there may be some nuance and differences among the terms, but 
do not ourselves have a preferred term. Moreover, we also note that at a very high level, the various terms are essentially 
synonymous.
2 Examples of public protests include pipelines in B.C., wind farms in Ontario, hydraulic fracturing in New Brunswick, and 
the Site C hydroelectric dam in B.C. See [57] CTV News, “Thousands Protest Northern Gateway Pipeline,” Oct. 22, 2012; 
[11] I. Bailey, “Protesters Rally Against Trans Mountain Pipeline, but Drilling Continues,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 24, 2014; 
[47] CBC News, “Wind Turbine Protest to Block Major Ontario Highway, Oct. 17, 2013; [46] CBC News, “RCMP, Protesters 
Withdraw After Shale Gas Clash in Rexton,” Oct. 17, 2013; [74] F. Dinshaw, “David Suzuki Rescues Capsized Canoers at 
Site C Dam Protest,” National Observer, July 12, 2015.
3 
While court challenges of National Energy Board decisions are the most high-profile (27 different applications in 2014) 
other regulators have been subject to court challenges, including the Alberta Energy Regulator on the oil sands ([98] Fort 
McKay First Nation v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2013 ABCA 355) and Ontario’s Environment Review Tribunal over a 
wind farm approval ([192] P. Morden, “Lambton County Wind Farm Approval Appealed,” Sarnia Observer, April 3, 2015).
4 For example, the recent government announcement on “restoring trust” in the government’s assessments. See [181] S. 
McCarthy, “Ottawa adds Additional Steps to Pipeline Reviews,” Globe and Mail, Jan. 27, 2016.
2While the government is reviewing environmental assessments and the NEB, it has 
announced that five principles will underpin its decision-making on pipelines [124]:
• No project review will need to start from square one – it will continue under the 
current legislative framework;
• Decisions will be evidence-based, including science and traditional indigenous 
knowledge;
• Affected communities and the public will be consulted;
• Indigenous people will also be consulted and accommodated where warranted; and
• GHG emissions associated directly with the project as well as upstream will be 
assessed.
This white paper is of direct relevance to the above-noted federal regulatory reviews. 
Specifically, the paper provides a detailed analysis of the literatures addressing public 
confidence in the regulatory processes, along with the specificities of Indigenous rights in 
the energy regulatory system, and concrete recommendations for changes to the regulatory 
framework to strengthen public faith in the system. The rest of the paper proceeds as 
follows. We begin with an overview of the role of regulatory bodies and regulation in 
Canada; readers more familiar with regulatory processes and levels of jurisdiction may 
choose to skip this section. The next section covers the history, definitions and use of the 
terms “social licence,” “social acceptance” and “public acceptance,” including attempts to 
measure the terms, how Aboriginal-Canadian rights differ from the idea of social licence, 
and examples in the context of energy projects. We then offer three cases on the state of 
Canada’s regulatory process — that it is broken (section 3), not broken (section 4.2), and not 
broken but can be improved (section 4.3). These cases are followed by conclusions (section 
5) and policy recommendations (section 6).
2. REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF REGULATORY BODIES
Any analysis of regulation and the role of regulatory bodies in the energy sector must 
begin with an appreciation of the policy context within which regulators function. Broadly 
speaking, energy policy addresses three key imperatives: economics, environment 
and security [107, 111, 251]. The first relates to markets, and deals with the economic 
underpinnings of energy markets, ensuring they work efficiently and competitively, and 
that Canadian energy producers have access to international markets for export. The second 
deals with the environmental impact of energy exploration, production, transmission and 
consumption, and comprises such matters as species at risk, human health and safety, 
climate change, and land and water use. The third policy imperative is energy security, 
and includes security for Canadian consumers and the economy (affordability, reliability, 
price stability and security of supply) as well as security of critical energy infrastructure 
(the physical and cyber-security of pipelines, nuclear facilities, electricity transmission 
infrastructure, etc.). Clearly, balancing among market, environmental and security 
imperatives in a way that garners social acceptance and support (a.k.a., social licence) is a 
tall order.
3In Canada, this policy complexity is further heightened by the division of energy powers 
in the constitution. Canada has one of the most divided and decentralized constitutional 
arrangements for energy among Western industrialized countries [77]. When it comes to 
energy markets, the provinces are dominant players. They have constitutional jurisdiction 
over non-renewable natural resources, including exploration, development, management, 
royalties and intra-provincial energy trade and commerce. They also have jurisdiction over 
the generation, production, transmission and sales of electricity within their boundaries 
(nuclear is an exception, as discussed below). The federal government’s powers most closely 
related to energy markets derive from its jurisdiction over interprovincial and international 
trade and commerce (including foreign investment), international treaty-making, taxation, 
fisheries, and energy development offshore and on frontier lands. The federal government 
has truncated or devolved a number of its powers in these areas. With respect to offshore 
and frontier lands, it has negotiated agreements with provincial and territorial governments 
to delegate or co-manage regulatory authority and royalties. And with the negotiation of 
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, it in effect used federal treaty-making powers to 
liberalize international energy trade, thereby reducing its control over international energy 
flows. 
Ottawa also intervenes in the energy sector via federal spending power and equalization. 
With respect to the former, recent examples include federal loan guarantees for the Muskrat 
Falls hydroelectric development in Newfoundland and Labrador, and federal investments 
in carbon capture and storage projects in Alberta and Saskatchewan. With respect to the 
latter, the federal government decides whether or not (or under what circumstances and 
how) energy royalties or other provincial revenues in the energy sector are included in 
equalization formulas. The federal government also plays a strong role when it comes to the 
development of energy resources on or crossing Aboriginal lands, given its jurisdiction over 
reserves and in instances where it negotiates land claims or other agreements (provinces, of 
course, can also be key actors in these arrangements).
The environmental imperative of energy policy arguably generates the greatest level of 
involvement of both provincial and federal governments in the energy sphere. Provinces 
have jurisdiction over the conservation of energy resources within their boundaries as 
well as intra-provincial environmental impacts of energy. The federal government has 
jurisdiction over trans-boundary environmental impacts, as well as fisheries, navigation 
and shipping, agriculture, criminal law, and the power to legislate for peace, order and 
good government. Any single energy project is very likely, therefore, to trigger federal and 
provincial governments’ involvement through their respective environmental powers. 
When it comes to energy security, the federal government is a dominant player through 
its role in critical energy infrastructure protection and in nuclear safety via the Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission. The federal government has also promoted nuclear industry 
development through the Crown corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, portions 
of which have been privatized in recent years. 
In pursuing the complexity of policy aims in the energy sphere, both federal and provincial 
governments employ the policy instrument of regulation. Regulation, as a policy tool, refers 
to “rules of behaviour backed up by sanctions of the state” [78]. It is expressed in a variety 
4of forms — constitutions, statutes, delegated legislation, guidelines, standards, codes, etc. 
— to which varying degrees of state sanction are attached [77].5
In terms of implementation, governments delegate regulation and regulatory development 
to agencies such as the National Energy Board, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, the Ontario Energy Board and the 
Alberta Energy Regulator. 
Legislatures set the overall policy frameworks within which regulators function via 
enabling legislation (e.g., the National Energy Board Act).6 Statutes stipulate the broad 
policy objectives to be pursued by the regulator when it comes to developing regulatory 
frameworks and making decisions about individual energy projects. This institutional 
arrangement aims to depoliticize decision-making on individual projects. Rather than 
project approvals playing out in the political arena, regulatory agencies undertake expert 
evidence-based analyses in a quasi-judicial setting. They are generally directed by their 
enabling legislation to regulate in the public interest, which is defined in statute as pursuing 
a variety of policy imperatives (e.g., economic development, environmental protection, 
affordability, security, etc.). 
Regulators develop detailed regulations to fulfil their mandate in operational terms, 
translating broad policy objectives such as “pursuing the public interest,” “economic 
development,” “environmental protection,” and the like into concrete rules, guidelines and 
standards to which industry proponents and individual projects must adhere. In addition to 
these substantive regulatory measures, regulators also develop procedural frameworks for 
how they will make their decisions. These include whether or under what circumstances 
a public hearing will be held, along with whom, and how various stakeholders can 
participate in the decision-making process. The resulting framework of substantive and 
procedural regulations is revised and modified on an ongoing basis in light of experience, 
available budgetary resources, new scientific evidence and industry practices, stakeholder 
expectations, etc. As such, the regulatory framework is forever a work in progress. 
Moreover, regulatory bodies in different jurisdictions may interpret similar policy 
objectives in varying ways owing to their particular institutional, economic, environmental, 
geological, political and social contexts.
What is common to their activities, however, is that they either approve or reject proposed 
projects in light of the regulatory framework governing their decision-making in 
substantive and procedural terms. If a regulator approves a project, a licence is awarded 
to the project proponent, usually with a variety of conditions that a company must adhere 
to when it comes to project development, operation and abandonment. Once a project is 
underway, regulators monitor project activities for compliance, and can enforce regulations 
with sanctions (fines, suspension of licence, etc.) in cases of non-compliance. 
5 As noted in the concluding section of this paper, governments have also engaged in deregulation, notably to liberalize 
energy markets. In Canada, this got underway in the 1980s in oil and gas, in the 1990s in electricity, and included price 
deregulation, trade liberalization and introducing greater competition into energy markets. See [227] A. Plourde, “The 
Changing Nature of National and Continental Energy Markets,” Canadian Energy Policy and the Struggle for Sustainable 
Development, edited by G. Bruce Doern. 
6 In a Westminster system with strict party discipline like Canada’s, this effectively means that governments holding a 
majority of seats in the legislature set the policy framework within which regulators function. 
5When a project proponent or other stakeholder disagrees with a regulatory body’s decision, 
there are various mechanisms of appeal. These include appeals directly to the government 
(usually to a minister or cabinet, which can overturn a decision) and appeals to the courts 
(different courts depending on the nature of the appeal).
At the federal level, the National Energy Board was created in 1959 following a 
recommendation of the 1957 Royal Commission on Energy (the Borden Commission), 
which analyzed the interplay between domestic and international energy markets [183]. The 
1950s were a transformative period for the Canadian energy sector as it began to produce 
oil and gas far in excess of requirements in the province of production. Prior to the NEB’s 
creation, in order to ship oil and gas beyond provincial boundaries, pipeline companies 
required parliamentary approval to become incorporated, which opened the door to political 
interference in market decision-making. 
At the time, not unlike today, there were multiple major pipeline proposals on the table 
to carry Canadian energy to domestic and export (at the time, only American) markets. 
Political debates in the 1950s turned on which markets Canadian oil and gas should serve 
(domestic and/or American), which pipeline routes should be used to carry it there, and 
whether pipeline companies should be wholly Canadian-owned and controlled. Political 
debate was fierce and contentious, to the point that the St. Laurent Liberal government 
lost power to the Diefenbaker Progressive Conservatives in the 1957 general election, in 
part because of its position on pipelines. Almost immediately upon gaining power, the 
Diefenbaker government struck a royal commission to undertake an independent study of a 
host of energy policy issues.
The Borden Commission’s mandate included consideration of which regulatory framework 
should govern pipeline approvals and the setting of pipeline tolls, rates and tariffs for 
shippers. The commission recommended that the government create an independent 
regulatory commission to take decisions on interprovincial and international energy 
projects (pipeline construction, tolls, tariffs and rates). 
The National Energy Board Act, passed into law in 1959, confers authority on the NEB to 
regulate offshore areas and frontier lands not covered by federal-provincial agreements; 
the construction, operation and abandonment of interprovincial and international energy 
infrastructure (oil and gas pipelines and, where designated, electric power lines); tolls and 
tariffs for oil and gas pipelines under its jurisdiction; international exports and imports of 
natural gas; and international exports of oil, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products 
and electricity. This mandate circumscribes the geographical and functional activities 
over which the NEB has regulatory authority. The act also circumscribes the extent of the 
Board’s authority. In the case of pipeline project approvals, for example, the original act 
conferred on the Board the authority to reject pipeline proposals, but given the potential 
national impact of constructing new pipelines, final authority to approve projects rested 
with the government [129]. Similarly, the NEB Act does not mandate the Board to address 
climate change or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thereby leaving these issues in the 
hands of policy-makers (the NEB examines the emissions generated from the construction 
and operation of a pipeline, but it does not have authority to regulate GHG emissions 
6produced when fossil fuels are extracted, produced or consumed7) [77]. Nonetheless, there 
is no question that the NEB’s original energy-sector-based regulatory role has been joined 
over time by consideration of environmental and safety concerns, some in conjunction 
with other legislation and regulatory agencies — in environment, for example, with the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency [77]. Most recently, as noted above, while the federal government is reviewing 
the environmental assessment process and the NEB, it has announced interim changes 
for major energy projects, in particular that the government will include an assessment of 
upstream emissions from the production of fossil fuels in decisions.8 The extent to which 
this change will affect the NEB’s mandate and process is yet to be determined.
The legislative frameworks governing the mandates and activities of energy regulators 
like the NEB are, of course, not static. Governments, through the legislative process, can 
and do amend regulators’ enabling legislation when political, economic, geological, social 
or other circumstances change. In the NEB’s case, for example, the federal government 
brought a bill before Parliament to amend the NEB Act in 2012, in the context of a broader 
process of legislative change aimed at reducing regulatory burden on investors in Canada’s 
natural resource sector. Under the banner of Responsible Resource Development (unveiled 
in Budget 2012), the government noted that “those who wish to invest in our resources 
have been facing an increasingly complicated web of rules and bureaucratic reviews that 
have grown over time, adding costs and delays that can deter investors and undermine the 
economic viability of major projects.”9
Amendments to the NEB Act undertaken in this legislative reform process included: 
• The requirement that applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity (CPCN) that the NEB plans to reject come to cabinet for review and 
possible approval (i.e., final decision-making power to both approve or deny a CPCN 
now rests with the government);
• The establishment of a fixed timeline between the date a CPCN or exemption order 
application is complete and the submission of a recommendation by the Board to the 
government (15 months, although extensions are possible); and
• Enhanced powers for the Chair of the NEB to intervene in an application process if it 
appears the new timelines are not likely to be met. 
While the government’s stated aim with these amendments was to support expeditious 
and timely project reviews, some have criticized the changes for reducing the 
comprehensiveness of regulatory reviews, decreasing the opportunity for various 
stakeholders to participate in NEB decision-making processes, and for leaving the fate of 
major project proposals directly in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet. 
7 See [279] Peter Watson, “In the Eye of the Storm,” Speech to the Economic Club of Canada. Canadian Energy Summit, 
2014, Calgary, Alberta, Nov. 21, 2014.
8 See [124] Government of Canada, “Government of Canada Moves to Restore Trust in Environmental Assessment,” January 
Jan. 27, 2016.
9 See [122] Government of Canada, Ministry of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 
2012: 88. 
7To be fair, the NEB has had its hands full with unprecedented numbers of individuals, 
groups and other parties wanting to participate in its hearing processes, and some on 
grounds that go beyond the issues the NEB considers in its review processes, notably 
climate change. This was perhaps most vividly on display during the Joint Review Panel 
(JRP) process for the Northern Gateway pipeline proposal, when opponents of the project 
banded together to mob the mic at JRP hearings. More recently, the NEB was presented 
with a petition by organizations, including 350.org, Leadnow.ca and the Council of 
Canadians, demanding the Board include greenhouse gas emissions from the oil sands in  
its review of the Energy East pipeline proposal. The groups stated the petition was 
supported by some 100,000 Canadians, which would make it the largest petition ever 
submitted to the NEB. 
As suggested above and throughout this paper, expectations for stakeholder involvement in 
regulatory processes appear to be mounting. At this stage, however, it is not always clear 
that regulatory processes are the appropriate channels for voicing concerns, particularly 
where they deal with policy matters beyond the scope of a regulator’s legislative mandate 
(e.g., climate change). Where expectations are in-mandate, the provision in the 2015 federal 
budget of additional funding to the NEB for public participation in pipeline proposal 
reviews suggests the government recognizes that public involvement in regulatory 
processes is important and requires additional resources in order to be undertaken. 
This discussion of the NEB points to both the place of regulators in the broader energy 
policy sphere, as well as the sorts of challenges regulators face when it comes to social 
acceptance and support (or lack thereof) for energy development. At the provincial level, 
virtually all provinces have established regulatory bodies in the energy sphere. Section 
3.6.3 of this paper includes an examination of the mandate, roles and activities of the 
Ontario Energy Board for illustrative purposes.
When it comes to real or perceived public dissatisfaction with regulators, regulatory 
processes or regulatory decisions, a number of issues emerge as important takeaways from 
this discussion:
• Regulators are not policy-makers. They operate within the context of a legislatively 
defined mandate that lays out broad policy objectives. Regulatory agencies develop 
a detailed regulatory framework through which to pursue these policy objectives. 
Where public dissatisfaction pertains to questions of policy, regulators may be ill-
positioned to address them; 
• Regulators are intended to be technical, expert-based bodies that make decisions 
based on a rational assessment of evidence, not based on political expediency. They 
were created in order to depoliticize decision-making with respect to individual 
energy projects. Nonetheless, where project proposals are contentious, regulators’ 
actions may be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as political if they are seen to privilege 
one dimension of their mandate (e.g., economic development) over another (e.g., 
environmental protection);
• While regulators operate at arm’s-length from the government of the day, they are 
public bodies whose authority ultimately derives from Parliament and provincial  
 
8legislatures, and their decisions can be appealed to public authorities, be they the 
government of the day or the courts;
• Public expectations for greater involvement in regulatory decision-making can bear 
real consequences for regulators and the regulatory process, including increasing 
financial costs and timelines. 
3.  HISTORY, DEFINITIONS AND USE OF SOCIAL LICENCE AND SOCIAL 
ACCEPTANCE
“Drunks are accorded great social licence in Oaxacan villages. They may shout insults, 
intrude uninvited into social gatherings, and behave in other normally unacceptable 
ways” [68]. 
As reflected in the epigram, social licence is not a new concept, and in fact, has long 
been understood to play a vital control function in society.10 Over the past two decades, 
however, there have been increasing references to the concept of social licence, especially 
in the context of mining, hydrocarbon extraction, and other resource-intensive projects. For 
instance, news media mentioned the term fewer than 10 times in the years 1997 through 
2002, but more than 1,000 times each in 2013 and 2014.11 Most often, the concept of social 
licence has been promulgated by industry executives and government officials [234]. And 
yet, despite the term’s growing popularity, to our knowledge no comprehensive academic 
review of this work has been undertaken. In this section, we review and analyze existing 
literature, including industry publications, popular books, journal articles, and reports from 
industry, consultants and government. Rather than a singular concept, our review identifies 
and synthesizes what we term three different “varieties of social licence.” 
After highlighting some of the similarities and differences between these varieties, 
we distill one concept common to all of them: legitimacy. To the extent that the core 
idea animating social licence is legitimacy, it can be understood as akin to putting 
old wine in a new bottle. In fact, scholars have long understood that all organizations, 
whether governments, corporations or non-profits, must demonstrate their legitimacy, 
or social acceptability, if they are to survive and succeed. Conversely, as prior research 
has repeatedly shown, a lack of legitimacy can be a formidable, even fatal, threat to 
organizational success and survival. 
3.1. Varieties of Social Licence
3.1.1. The Pyramid Model
The first variety of social licence we review, known as the pyramid model, was developed 
iteratively in a series of articles, papers and presentations by mining industry consultants 
10 In Oaxaca, Mexico, evidence of human habitation dates to 11,000 BC. 
11 We searched Factiva for mentions of “social licence” or “social licence” in North American print media, Jan. 1, 1997 to  
Dec. 31, 2014, inclusive. 
9over the 14-year period from 2000 to 2013. As the inspiration for their model, proponents 
credit James Cooney, then an executive at Canadian gold mining company Placer Dome 
[24, 27, 261].12 In 1996, Placer Dome had been severely criticized after a tailings dam failed 
at one of its mines in the Philippines, releasing toxic mud into a river and burying a village 
[27]. More generally, mining was ranked the worst of 24 U.S. industries in a 1996 Roper 
opinion poll, behind even the tobacco industry [261]. It was in this context in 1997 that 
Cooney reportedly characterized the industry’s problems to officials with the World Bank 
as a matter of obtaining a “social licence to operate.” Personnel from the World Bank are 
said to have circulated the term at a May 1997 conference on “mining and the community” 
that was held in Quito, Ecuador [261].
In 2002, the International Institute of Environment and Development published Breaking 
New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development. The result of a two-year 
process, this landmark industry report declared that the industry “has been failing to 
convince some of its constituents and stakeholders that it has the social licence to operate in 
many parts of the world” [150]. Without ever defining what it meant by social licence, the 
report revealed an inextricable link between the mining industry’s survival and the notion 
of social licence. In short, this variant of social licence to operate “emerged as an industry 
response to opposition and a mechanism to ensure the viability of the sector” [218].
From there, the metaphor apparently stuck. For instance, in a 2003 project sponsored by 
Newmont Mining Corporation, Business for Social Responsibility published six case 
studies on social licence to operate in the mining industry, noting: “Gaining a social 
licence to operate simply means gaining support for the project from concerned groups, 
or stakeholders, over and above meeting any legal requirements” [33]. A convenience 
survey (n = 152) of mining industry participants conducted during 2005-2006 found 78 per 
cent of respondents were familiar with the term “social licence”; 81 per cent agreed that 
social licence referred to “the acceptance and belief by society, and specifically our local 
communities, in the value creation of our activities, such as we are allowed to access and 
extract mineral resources”; and 56 per cent reported their organization used the term or its 
underlying concepts [201].
As articulated in these accounts, social licence to operate was initially little more than 
a memorable turn of phrase, “a term largely invented by business, for business” [194, 
234]. Based on our review, a February 2000 article in CIM Bulletin entitled “Earning a 
Social Licence to Operate” was the first attempt to provide the term with some conceptual 
substance [156]. Susan Joyce, a consultant with Calgary, Canada-based Golder Associates, 
and Ian Thomson, an independent consultant from Vancouver, Canada, began their article 
by cataloguing various social risks facing mining companies in Latin America. At the 
project level, these risks were argued to threaten social acceptability by posing what they 
termed “problems of legitimacy.” To counter these legitimacy problems they proposed [156]: 
12 There are some discrepancies between Thomson and Boutilier (2011) [261] and Boutilier (2014) [27]. For instance, Thomson 
and Boutilier (2011: 1779) described Jim Cooney as “director of international and public affairs,” whereas Boutilier (2014: 
263) described him as “vice president of external relations.” Thomson and Boutilier indicated the World Bank conference 
occurred in May 1997, whereas Boutilier described it as “early 1998.” Based on documents from the World Bank, we 
ascertained that the conference was held May 6-8, 1997, and the proceedings were published in April 1998 (see [184], G. 
McMahon, 1998. “Mining and the Community: Results of the Quito Conference.” Quito, Ecuador: The World Bank). Of 
note, however, we found no mentions of “social licence” or Cooney in the proceedings. Thus, the archival record is not able 
to confirm this particular origin story.
10
“A social licence to operate exists when a mineral exploration or mining project is seen 
as having the approval, the broad acceptance of society to conduct its activities … Such 
acceptability must be achieved on many levels, but it must begin with, and be firmly 
grounded in, the social acceptance of the resource development by local communities.” 
Some years later, in an industry conference presentation, Thomson and Joyce 
expanded their definition of social licence to operate to include three normative 
components: legitimacy,13 credibility and trust [264]. They defined legitimacy as 
“conforming to established norms — norms may be legal, social, cultural and both formal 
and informal”; credibility as “the quality of being believed — the capacity or power to 
elicit belief”; and trust as “willingness to be vulnerable to risk or loss through the actions 
of another.” They further differentiated between project acceptance and approval, arguing 
that legitimacy was necessary for acceptance, whereas they linked credibility and trust 
with approval. Looking back on these developments, Robert Boutilier [27], also an industry 
consultant, credited Joyce and Thomson as having made two distinctive contributions. 
For one, they were the first to define social licence to operate in terms of legitimacy. And 
two, their work proposed that social licence to operate at the project level would promote 
reputation benefits at the corporate level.14
Thomson and Boutilier reiterated this threefold definition of social licence to operate (i.e., 
legitimacy, credibility and trust) and elaborated a multilevel pyramid model, illustrated in 
Figure 1 [261, 262]. In this model, legitimacy was conceptualized as distinguishing between 
projects that have their social licence to operate withheld or withdrawn and projects that are 
accepted. Credibility was conceptualized as distinguishing between project acceptance and 
approval. Finally, trust was conceptualized as distinguishing between project approval and 
what they initially called “co-ownership,” but later labelled “psychological identification” 
[261]. In addition to its original proponents, the Australian Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility recently has adopted the pyramid model of social licence to operate. Notably, 
the centre’s managing director, Leeora Black, has promoted the pyramid model as a 
“management framework for complex times” [24].
13 As we will discuss later, the construal of legitimacy as merely a normative concept represents an incomplete understanding 
relative to prior academic formulations. Rather, legitimacy has been conceptualized as multifaceted, entailing not only a 
normative dimension, but others as well (e.g., cognitive, socio-political).
14 Implicit in such a proposition is the assumption of a more complex multilevel relationship, an implication that to our 
knowledge has not been fully explored in prior work.
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FIGURE 1 THE PYRAMID MODEL
Source: Adapted from [29] R. G. Boutilier and I. Thomson, “Modelling and Measuring the Social Licence to Operate:  
Fruits of a Dialogue Between Theory and Practice,” 2011.
In sum, the pyramid model of social licence to operate initially emerged as “a term largely 
invented by business, for business” [194, 234]. From there, a coterie of consultants have 
attempted to give the term some conceptual substance, linking it with existing social 
scientific concepts — legitimacy, credibility and trust [24, 28, 156, 261, 262, 264]. Most 
recently, Black has defined social licence to operate as a “level of acceptance or approval 
continually granted to an organization’s operations or project by local community and other 
stakeholders” [24]. At its core, the pyramid model considers social licence to operate as “a 
judgment about the legitimacy of your company or operations” [24].
The pyramid model posits four levels of social licence to operate, ranging from withdrawal 
to acceptance to approval to psychological identification. Further, the level of social 
licence to operate with regard to a company or project is said to vary across time or 
between stakeholder groups in response to actions by the company or its stakeholders. 
For the most part, this work has been published in the form of industry presentations, 
industry conference papers, a handbook chapter and industry trade journal articles. To our 
knowledge, this particular variant of social licence to operate has not been subjected to any 
meaningful peer review. As one consequence, this work is little cited, with a total of 257 
citations across seven publications dating back some 15 years (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 SCHOLARLY IMPACT OF THE PYRAMID MODEL
Authors Date Format Citations
[156] Joyce & Thomson 2000 Industry article 80
[264] Thomson & Joyce 2008 Industry presentation 12
[261] Thomson & Boutilier 2011 Mining handbook chapter 98
[29] Boutilier & Thomson 2011 Working paper 33
[262] Thomson, Boutilier & Black 2011 Industry presentation 0
[28] Boutilier, Black & Thomson 2012 Industry paper 24
[24] Black 2013 Electronic book 10
Totals 257
Note: Citation counts from Google Scholar, May 1, 2016.
3.1.2. The Three-Strand Model 
A second variety of social licence, that we refer to as the three-strand model, was developed 
in a series of interrelated publications in 2003 and 2004 [131, 132, 157, 265]. Whereas the 
pyramid model started with the term social licence to operate and worked backwards, 
Neil Gunningham and colleagues started with a series of research questions and worked 
forward: “Why has corporate environmental performance improved over time? Despite 
this improvement, why are some firms better environmental performers than others? How, 
and to what extent, can corporations be motivated to go beyond compliance with existing 
environmental regulations?” [131: 2].
To answer these questions, these scholars conducted an in-depth study of the environmental 
performance of a sample of 14 pulp mills located in the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. The comparative nature of their research design enabled them to 
study the extent to which different regulatory methods provide greater incentives for 
(or impediments to) corporate decisions to go beyond compliance with regulatory 
requirements; how pressure from community or environmental groups was facilitated 
or inhibited by different regulatory regimes; and the role of corporate factors, such as 
the attitudes and commitments of the company executives, in shaping environmental 
performance. Data sources included lengthy on-site, semi-structured interviews with 
environmental managers at each sampled facility and in most cases with mill managers as 
well, and a variety of quantitative and qualitative environmental performance indicators. 
Based on their research, the authors proposed that companies in “closely watched 
industries” depend upon a multi-stranded licence to operate. One strand is the legal licence: 
the regulatory permits and statutory obligations embodying the demands of regulators, 
legislators and judges. A second strand is the social licence: the demands of local and 
national environmental activists, local community groups, and, on occasion, the general 
public. The third strand is the economic licence: the demands of top management, lenders 
and investors for cost-cutting and profitability. In addition to their direct effects, these 
different strands were proposed to have interactive effects. For example, environmental 
groups may seek to enforce social licence directly (e.g., through shaming and adverse 
publicity), but also may attempt to influence the terms of the economic licence (e.g., 
generating consumer boycotts of environmentally damaging products), and of the legal 
licence (e.g., through citizen suits or political pressure for regulatory initiatives). 
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More recently, John Morrison, executive director of the Institute for Human Rights and 
Business, has proposed a variant of the three-strand model (see Figure 2) [194]. Morrison 
retains the legal licence and social licence, but refers to political licence rather than 
economic licence. Although this may seem like a significant difference, it may be of little 
consequence. The only time the political licence is not driven by economic considerations, 
is if “you live in North Korea” [194: 22].
FIGURE 2 THE THREE-STRAND MODEL
Source: Adapted from Figure 2.2 in [194] J. Morrison, The Social Licence: How to Keep Your Organization Legitimate, 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 21.
Over the past decade, the original three-strand model [131, 132, 157, 265] has spawned a  
variety of follow-on work. One particularly interesting paper by Gary Lynch-Wood and  
David Williamson focused on how social licence can affect the environmental performance  
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) [177]. In particular, this work examined whether  
social licence concerns are sufficient to entice smaller firms to go beyond regulatory  
compliance in their environmental performance. Lynch-Wood and Williamson present five  
factors that make up the social licence: environmental impact of the firm’s products and  
processes; customer power; customer interest; corporate/brand visibility; and community  
pressure. They argued that at least two of these factors must be salient to an SME for it to  
go beyond compliance in its environmental performance. They provide examples where  
larger, highly visible global organizations have gone beyond compliance, and concluded that 
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for most SMEs, none of these five factors is significant enough to encourage going beyond 
compliance, and therefore, regulators cannot depend on social licence considerations to 
either incentivize or sanction these firms. 
Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan corroborated this conclusion in two papers [266, 267]. 
In these papers, the authors returned to the same interview techniques they used in their 
original pulp and paper mill study, but this time studied the U.S. trucking sector. The 
authors characterize this industry as being representative of a perfectly competitive one, 
with many small-sized firms operating with tight profit margins. In these works, social 
licence is defined as pressure from communities, advocacy groups, employees and the 
news media. In a finding very similar to Lynch-Wood and Williamson, they concluded that, 
due primarily to low social visibility, environmental decisions in small trucking firms are 
driven almost entirely by the economic licence, and that social licence pressures faced by 
these firms are very weak. 
Howard-Grenville, Nash and Coglianese add to this discussion by showing that the beyond-
compliance activities organizations undertake are not solely driven by external factors, such 
as social licence concerns [145]. Specifically, the authors examined five internal factors: 
managerial incentives; organizational culture; organizational identity; organizational 
self-monitoring; and personal affiliations and commitments. They examined the impact 
of these factors in interviews with 10 companies, five of which were participating in the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s voluntary National Environmental Performance 
Track program. The authors found that firms in the two groups differed in three of the 
factors — company identity, self-monitoring and managerial incentives. They concluded 
that, while external regulatory, social and economic factors are certainly significant in 
a company’s willingness to go beyond compliance, it is also independently affected by 
internal factors as well. 
In sum, the three-strand model of social licence emerged as an explanation for observed 
differences in corporate environmental performance [131, 132, 157, 264]. Subsequent work 
has added to our understanding of how specific stakeholder groups can influence social 
licence [177, 266, 267], and has expanded the model to account for internal organizational-
level factors [145]. At its core, the three-strand model posits that organizations depend 
upon a multi-stranded licence to operate, and that these factors both independently and 
interactively shape corporate environmental performance. The three-strand model has been 
developed exclusively by academics who have published their research in scholarly books 
and peer-reviewed articles. As one consequence, the eight publications have been cited 
some 1,486 times during the past 13 years (see Table 2). 
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TABLE 2 SCHOLARLY IMPACT OF THE THREE-STRAND MODEL
Authors Date Format Citations
[131] Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton 2003 Academic book 372
[157] Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton 2003 Peer-reviewed article 305
[265] Thornton, Kagan & Gunningham 2003 Peer-reviewed article 79
[132] Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton 2004 Peer-reviewed article 495
[177] Lynch-Wood & Williamson 2007 Peer-reviewed article 59
[145] Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese 2008 Peer-reviewed article 107
[266] Thornton, Gunningham & Kagan 2008 Peer-reviewed article 27
[267] Thornton, Gunningham & Kagan 2009 Peer-reviewed article 42
Totals 1,486
Note: Citation counts from Google Scholar, May 1, 2016.
3.1.3. The Triangle Model
The two literature streams already reviewed explicitly discuss social licence, one in the 
context of the mining industry, and the other in closely watched industries such as pulp and 
paper mills. Our third variant developed the concept of social acceptance in the context 
of the renewable energy sector. Namely, in the 1970s and 1980s, amid the first concerted 
efforts to develop renewable energy policies, policy-makers, energy companies, investors 
and academics assumed implementation would be unproblematic due to consistently high 
polling support for wind, solar, and other renewable technologies. Academic research 
conceived of the social acceptance issue more in the sense of building confidence, 
familiarity and trust in environmentally friendly but unproven technologies. This was 
considered to be required to generate the support from policy-makers to put in place the 
financial and regulatory incentives that were necessary to overcome entrenched interests 
and path dependency of conventional fossil fuel energy systems. 
Initially, the problem of social acceptance was largely neglected, in part because public 
opinion surveys indicated very high levels of support for renewable energy options. 
However, Carlman has shown that public opinion surveys did not necessarily translate into 
“public, political and regulatory acceptance” of renewables, such as wind power [41]. Her 
analysis showed these “non-technical factors” were more consequential to social acceptance 
than public opinions. 
More recently, Wüstenhagen et al. summarized this work as highlighting “a powerful 
barrier to the achievement of renewable energy targets: social acceptance” [291]. They 
distinguished three dimensions (see Figure 3). Socio-political acceptance refers to the 
broadest, most general level of social acceptance, of both policies and technologies, by 
the public, key stakeholders and policymakers. Community acceptance refers “to the 
specific acceptance of siting decisions and renewable energy projects by local stakeholders, 
particularly local residents and local authorities” [291: 2685]. Additionally, community 
acceptance implicates “a time dimension” in the sense that the pattern of local acceptance is 
apt to vary considerably before, during and after the implementation of a particular project. 
Market acceptance refers to the process of market adoption of an innovation. In particular, 
energy projects are embedded in complex multi-sided infrastructures, in which consumers, 
investors and producers are all involved. 
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Wüstenhagen et al. describe this form of social acceptance of renewables as “socio-
political” to distinguish it from the responses of host communities to wind farms or other 
renewables (“community acceptance”) and from the “market acceptance” of consumers 
as measured through willingness-to-pay models [291]. This three-pronged distinction 
continues to provide a useful point of departure for this literature. Public opinion polls tend 
to show that while the general public remains favourable to the idea of wind, solar, biomass, 
wave, geothermal and other renewable energy technologies (“socio-political acceptance”), 
host communities are not as supportive (“community acceptance” [72, 73, 223]). Wind 
energy projects are the most studied examples [70, 93, 272, 288]. This literature is clear 
that there is an important distinction between support for wind energy in the abstract and a 
specific local wind project. This distinction is corroborated by several studies on the social 
acceptability of wind energy projects in the province of Quebec, which show that proposed 
wind energy projects in the Gaspé region of Quebec are extremely territorialized due to 
local concerns about alteration of the landscape far outweighing all other variables in the 
decision process [100, 101, 102, 109].15 There is no reason to expect that general public 
support for wind energy will automatically translate into local support for specific wind 
energy projects. This concept is sometimes referred to as the “social gap” in the literature to 
signify the gap between public support for the general goal of more wind energy but a lack 
of on-the-ground support [19, 20].
FIGURE 3 THE TRIANGLE MODEL
Source: Adapted from [291] R. Wustenhagen, M. Wolsink, and M. J. Burer, “Social Acceptance of Renewable Energy 
Innovation: An Introduction to the Concept,” Energy Policy 35, 2007, 2683-2691.
The reaction to the social gap from policy-makers, renewable energy developers and 
other experts is a tendency to see recalcitrant local publics who oppose renewable energy 
15 
There is a significant body of French literature on the topic of l’acceptabilité sociale from a handful of Quebec scholars, 
which was beyond our resources to examine in great detail. Significant pieces on the topic of wind power in Quebec are 
referenced above.
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projects as ignorant and uninformed. The not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) concept describes 
the situation in which an individual is in favour of renewable energy (or any other 
development) as long as it is nowhere near their own residence. It has become unfashionable 
for social scientists to give credence to this explanation. Instead, researchers strive to 
understand opponents on their own terms and not presume actions as selfish or deviant 
[2]. Nevertheless, survey results often show the NIMBY position is present at low levels 
in host communities [276, 287, 288], and some argue that NIMBY is a rational reaction 
for some individuals that should be recognized via policies that attempt to quantify any 
costs incurred by those living in proximity to a renewable energy project and arrange for 
compensation [53].
Important conceptual critiques of the term “social acceptance” have been made by Batel 
et al., who point out that academic research tends to erroneously conflate acceptance 
with support [16]. They show that residents react differently when asked if they would 
accept an energy project versus when asked if they support an energy project. Acceptance 
implies a more passive relationship to an energy project. Walker and Cass make the 
further observation that academic research (and policy-makers) tend to view the public as 
supporters, opponents or somewhere in the middle of that spectrum [275]. They point out 
that there are many additional roles for members of the public. For example, the public may 
potentially be service users, investors, owners, lessees of land or buildings upon which 
energy generation equipment is hosted, captive consumers, protesters and more. The point 
is that acceptance and support imply a degree of agency that is not necessarily realistic. 
The geography of centralized energy distribution, for example of a 200 megawatt wind 
farm feeding electricity into a regional grid, involves thousands of disparate members of 
the public who may be totally unaware of their use of renewable sources of energy. In this 
sense, active acceptance is an imprecise term for the many forms of social relations that 
exist as renewables develop.
It is important to point out that, while the renewable energy literature has been slow to 
adopt the terminology of social licence, there are some notable exceptions [55, 134]. Hall 
and Jeanneret subsume their use of the term to the larger concept of corporate social 
responsibility and adopt the definition of social licence to operate provided by Thomson and 
Boutilier [261] of “ongoing acceptance or approval for a development granted by the local 
community and other stakeholders” [134]. Hall and Jeanneret’s exploratory study found 
wind developers in Australia interpreted the term as obligations for authentic community 
engagement. 
Despite a lack of attention to the term “social licence” in the renewable energy literature, 
several authors conceive local opposition as serving a necessary political function in the 
same way implied by the use of the legal/political term “licence.” For example, Barry and 
Ellis argue for new planning models that minimize the exercise of arbitrary authority to 
approve renewable energy generation facilities [15]. Ellis et al. argue that dissent serves an 
important purpose in democracies and that the critiques of renewable energy development 
can inform better societal decision-making [87]. Thus, the social acceptance or social gap 
concept relates closely to social licence in a shared emphasis on issues of legitimacy.
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TABLE 3 SCHOLARLY IMPACT OF THE TRIANGLE MODEL
Authors Date Format Citations
[287] Wolsink 2000 Peer-reviewed article 553
[19] Bell, Gray & Haggett 2005 Peer-reviewed article 386
[70] Devine-Wright 2005 Peer-reviewed article 604
[272] Van der Horst 2007 Peer-reviewed article 379
[288] Wolsink 2007 Peer-reviewed article 541
[291] Wüstenhagen, Wolsink & Bürer 2007 Peer-reviewed article 808
[2] Aitken 2010 Peer-reviewed article 115
[16] Batel, Devine-Wright & Tangeland 2013 Peer-reviewed article 50
[20] Bell, Gray, Haggett & Swaffield 2013 Peer-reviewed article 49
[101] Fortin & Fournis 2014 Peer-reviewed article 9
Totals 3,494
Note: Citation counts from Google Scholar, May 1, 2016.
3.2. Social Licence as Legitimacy
Despite their very different origins, all three varieties of social licence invoke a common 
concept: legitimacy. In some ways, this is hardly surprising. The concept of legitimacy 
“dates back to the dawn of organization theory” [62]. Max Weber is typically credited with 
introducing the term into social theory, and for linking legitimacy with conformity to social 
norms and formal laws [283]. Scott echoed these themes in his ground-breaking book: 
“Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting 
cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws” [248]. 
However, it was Suchman who offered what has become perhaps the most widely cited 
definition of legitimacy: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” [256]. Legitimacy is now a widely studied and cited 
concept throughout the social sciences. For instance, a cross-section of six publications 
ranging in age from nearly a century ago to a half-dozen years ago has been cited some 
47,140 times (see Table 4). 
In their classic work, Dowling and Pfeffer distinguished between three interdependent 
categories of organizational action: those that are economic, those that are legal, and those 
that are legitimate [82]. As they noted, “a legitimate purpose will not necessarily ensure 
resource allocation, nor will resource allocation necessarily ensure legitimacy” [82: 124]. 
Similarly, although laws in a democratic society are likely correlated with societal norms 
and values, these correlations are apt to be partial. First, because changes in the two spheres 
may take place at differing speeds. Second, because contradictions are inherent in norms, 
whereas there is a greater presumption of consistency in legal frameworks. And third, 
societies may tolerate certain activities informally, but not give them legal sanction. In other 
words, their model presciently foreshadows many elements of the three varieties of social 
licence we have reviewed, especially the three-strand model and the triangle model.
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TABLE 4 SCHOLARLY IMPACT OF LEGITIMACY RESEARCH
Authors Date Format Citations
[283] Weber 1922 Scholarly book 20,382
[82] Dowling & Pfeffer 1975 Peer-reviewed article 1,988
[248] Scott 1995 Scholarly book 14,959
[256] Suchman 1995 Peer-reviewed article 8,417
[13] Bansal & Clelland 2004 Peer-reviewed article 702
[62] Deephouse & Suchman 2008 Scholarly book chapter 692
Totals 47,140
Note: Citation counts from Google Scholar, May 1, 2016.
Along the way, various dimensions of legitimacy have been articulated. Notably, Aldrich 
and Fiol differentiated cognitive legitimacy, or “the spread of knowledge about a new 
venture,” from sociopolitical legitimacy, or “the process by which key stakeholders, the 
general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a venture as appropriate 
and right, given existing norms and laws” [4]. Scott divided this latter dimension in two, 
resulting in three dimensions of legitimacy: regulative, normative and cognitive, each 
linked with one of his three institutional pillars [248]. Suchman also proposed a trichotomy 
comprised of cognitive, moral and pragmatic legitimacy [256]. He coupled these with two 
temporal distinctions (episodic versus continual) and two substantive foci (organizational 
actions versus organizational essences), resulting in 12 distinct legitimacy types [62]. 
In another study relevant to our focus, Bansal and Clelland proposed the concept of 
corporate environmental legitimacy, defined as “the generalized perception or assumption 
that a firm’s corporate environmental performance is desirable, proper, or appropriate” 
[13]. Relative to the focus of this paper, what is striking is the extent to which the many 
definitions of legitimacy and social licence correspond (see Table 5). 
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TABLE 5 COMPARISON OF DEFINITIONS OF LEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL LICENCE
Definitions of Legitimacy Definitions of Social Licence
“Appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the 
involvement of the action in the social system.” ([222] Parsons, 1960: 175)
Justification of organization’s “right to exist.” ([180] Maurer, 1971: 361)
Implied congruence with the cultural environment, with “the norms of 
acceptable behavior in the larger social system.” (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975: 122)
Activities that are accepted and expected within a context are then said to be 
legitimate within that context. ([82] Pfeffer, 1981: 4)
Array of established cultural accounts that “provide explanations for existence.” 
([186] Meyer & Scott, 1983: 201)
“Social fitness.” ([213] Oliver, 1991: 160)
A generalized perception of organizational actions as “desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions.” ([256] Suchman, 1995: 574)
“The endorsement of an organization by social actors.” ([61] Deephouse, 1996: 
1025)
“Acceptance of the organization by its environment.” ([164] Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999: 64)
“A social judgment of appropriateness, acceptance, and/or desirability.” ([292] 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 416)
“The level of social acceptability bestowed upon a set of activities or actors.” 
([277] Washington & Zajac, 2005: 284)
“The degree to which broader publics view a company’s activities as socially 
acceptable and desirable because its practices comply with industry norms and 
broader societal expectations.” ([238] Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006: 55)
“Having the approval, the broad acceptance of society to conduct its activities.” 
([156] Joyce & Thomson, 2000: 52) 
Meeting “social expectations … gaining support for the project from concerned 
groups, or stakeholders, over and above meeting any legal requirements.” ([33] 
Business for Social Responsibility, 2003: 4)
When free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples has been 
practised and where key stakeholders have access to transparent information. 
(World Bank, 2004, as cited in [22] Bice 2014)
“The demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge 
from neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other 
elements of the surrounding civil society.” ([132] Gunningham et al., 2004: 308) 
“The idea that industrial facilities must comply with tacit expectations of 
regulators, local communities, and the public in order to continue operations.” 
([145] Howard-Grenville et al., 2008: 77) 
“Ongoing approval within the local community and other stakeholders.” ([261] 
Thomson & Boutilier, 2011: 1779) 
“Society’s moral and political approval, sufficiently widespread and stable to 
allow legal approvals to proceed and to assure ongoing community support.” 
([37] Canada West Foundation, 2013: 1)
“A form of social acceptance or approval ... a socially constructed perception 
that your company or project has a legitimate place in the community.” ([24] 
Black, 2013: 15) 
“Consists of gaining, nurturing, and renewing legitimacy with local groups, 
stakeholders and communities.” ([234] Raufflet et al., 2013: 2,229)
“Ongoing acceptance or approval from the local community and other 
stakeholders.” ([220] Parsons et al, 2014: 84) 
Note: Legitimacy definitions adapted from p. 153 of A. Bitektine, “Toward a Theory of Social Judgments of 
Organizations: The Case of Legitimacy, Reputation, and Status,” Academy of Management Review, 36(1), 2011, 151-179. 
Social licence definitions based on authors’ analysis.
What Table 5 makes clear is that definitions of legitimacy and social licence have 
considerable, perhaps even complete, overlap. Put simply, social licence is legitimacy 
and legitimacy is social acceptability, and vice versa. In light of this insight, for the 
purposes of this report, we propose to understand these three terms — social licence, 
legitimacy and social acceptability — as essentially synonymous. As further support for 
this conceptualization, it is worth considering the French translation for social licence: 
acceptabilité sociale.
Although some authors have expressed concern that social licence considerations may 
result in undemocratic outcomes, in the sense that the few are able to win over the many, 
legitimacy research suggests the opposite is also possible: “We suspect that legitimacy need 
not be conferred by a large segment of society for the organization (or subject) to prosper” 
[225]. In other words, legitimacy is as much the cure as it is the culprit. 
3.3. First Nations and Social Licence
The question of whether the term “social licence” applies to First Nations, Métis and Inuit 
peoples in Canada is critical to the exploration of the term’s use. Social licence is not a legal 
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licence in the normal sense of the word: it cannot be applied for, and there is no central 
authority that grants it. From the opposition side of a proposed project, social licence 
is a mechanism that can be used to defeat, influence, or negatively impact a proposed 
development project. From the proponents’ and their supporters’ side of a proposed project, 
social licence can be used as a mechanism to support project approval. One possible 
definition of social licence is the acceptance of a proposed development by those who live 
in the area and could be affected by this development. An example of this is Enbridge’s 
proposed Northern Gateway project, a twin pipeline that would transport diluted bitumen 
from Bruderheim, Alberta to Kitimat, British Columbia. Many communities along the 
proposed pipeline told Enbridge that the pipeline development was not welcome; the 
implication is that it did not have sufficient social licence to proceed. Aboriginal people 
along the pipeline route were also opposed, and the resulting question is: Does social 
licence include Aboriginal people? Aboriginal people, according to section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, include First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples of Canada. Each group will 
be considered separately in this section as they have different rights that must be considered 
independently.
3.3.1. First Nations Right to Consultation and Accommodation
In considering the applicability of the term “social licence” to First Nations, one must look 
to the rights of First Nations that have to be considered in any development on the lands and 
resources within their territories. These rights have been clearly delineated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which has made rulings about consultation, accommodation and consent 
in several cases, such as Haida Nation vs. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)16 in 2004, 
Mikisew Cree First Nation vs. Canada (Minister of Heritage)17 in 2005 and Rio Tinto Alcan 
Inc. vs. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council18 in 2010. The Haida Nation vs. British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests) case in particular has set out what the duty to consult is and what 
triggers that duty:
“The duty arises when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential 
existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely 
affect it.”19 [emphasis added]
Consultation is a good faith and reasonable information disclosure between the First Nation 
and government. The duty to consult occurs when there may be a potential to adversely 
affect the rights of the First Nation. This includes treaty rights, as established in Mikisew 
Cree First Nation vs. Canada (Minister of Heritage). It has the purpose of substantially 
addressing the First Nation interests at stake and the duty arises before legislation is enacted 
or action taken. Most importantly under the Crown’s duty to consult is how to carry out the 
process:
“The Crown, acting honourably cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal 
interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the 
16 [133] Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73.
17 [187] Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69.
18 [239] Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43.
19 [133] Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, paragraph 35. 
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process of treaty negotiation and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven, 
interests … To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving and 
resolve the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive the aboriginal claimants 
of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not honourable.”20 [emphasis added]
The Crown has a duty to consult that arises out of the honour of the Crown prior to proof of 
Aboriginal title and rights. Courts have said if there is any infringement on the cultural and 
economic interests of Aboriginal or treaty rights and title, governments must accommodate. 
The purpose of consultation is reconciliation and not simply the minimization of adverse 
impacts. During consultations, the Crown may continue to manage the resource in question.
3.3.2. First Nations Right of Consent
In the 1997 case of Delgamuukw vs. British Columbia,21 the Supreme Court of Canada 
stated that where rights were affected, consent was required. This was elaborated upon in 
Haida Nation vs. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), which said that where there were 
proven rights, there was a right of consent. There is room for exceptions, however — as 
the court also ruled that the Crown has to balance all interests. Unfortunately, many First 
Nations do not trust the Crown to fully balance their treaty rights against the economic 
benefits of further development; a recent example being the Treaty 8 First Nations affected 
by the potential development of the Site C dam in the Peace River Valley.22 In the Supreme 
Court Case of Tsilhqot’in Nation vs. British Columbia (2014), the ruling stated that First 
Nations views must now be included in determining the balancing of interests.23 Ultimately, 
though, it is the Crown that decides what that balance is. 
Tsilhqot’in vs. British Columbia further ruled that, on lands where Aboriginal title has been 
proved, the consent of the First Nation is needed.24 On lands where Aboriginal title has 
not been proved and the government wants to avoid a charge of infringement or failure to 
consent, the government should seek the consent of the First Nations.25 The court did say 
that even if a First Nation did not consent on proven Aboriginal title lands, the government 
could overrule it, but only on very strict grounds.26 These strict grounds are as follows:27
(1) That it discharged its procedural duty to consult and accommodate; 
(2) That its actions were backed by a compelling and substantial objective; and 
(3)  That the governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to 
the group. 
20 [133] Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, paragraph 27.
21 [66] Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, paragraph 168.
22 See [170] J. Lavoie, “Site C Dam is Final Straw for B.C.’s Treaty 8 First Nations,” Desmog Canada, July 3, 2014.
23 [268] Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, paragraphs 81-84.
24 Ibid, paragraph 76.
25 Ibid, paragraph 80.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, paragraph 7.
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Consistent with the fiduciary obligation means respecting the nature of the collective right: 
infringement cannot substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of title; there 
must be a rational connection to the objective; there must be minimal impairment to rights; 
and the benefits must outweigh the adverse impact. 
3.3.3. First Nations Rights vs. Social Licence
This brief summation of the First Nations right to consent or to be consulted illustrates that 
these rights go far beyond the concept of social licence discussed above. First Nations are 
owed a legal duty to be consulted and at times their consent is needed. Adverse impacts 
on First Nations’ rights can stop a project. A recent example of this is the case of Taseko’s 
Prosperity Mine.28 The federal government determined that the mine would have adverse 
effects on Aboriginal rights and should not be developed.29 The term “social licence” does 
not include a legal duty or obligation of the government or company to the public or other 
interested groups. Rather, social licence is considered to be for stakeholders or the general 
public, and is focused on the general public’s desire to have or not have a project in their 
area. Social licence does not include a right of consent. Social licence will only be able 
to prevent the development of a project if opponents can elevate the profile of their issues 
enough to create sufficient public support and political pressure. There is no formal process 
for the public to have a say beyond what is in national and provincial regulatory processes.
First Nations are rights holders, not stakeholders. The applicable regulatory regimes 
determine what input various stakeholders and the general public have, and this is currently 
restricted to those who will be directly impacted by a particular development. There may be 
open houses to provide input from the general public (as in the environmental assessment 
process) but largely there is very limited opportunity to raise concerns formally about a 
project. For example, under the National Energy Board process, section 55.2 of the NEB 
Act30 sets out that the Board shall consider the representations of any person, who, in the 
Board’s opinion, is directly affected by the application. The person must also have relevant 
information or expertise. A person may be an individual, company, organization or group. 
The Board’s decision is final.
If people, groups or ENGOs are not able to achieve standing to participate in a regulatory 
process, they can make use of media and social media, protests, forums, petitions and 
other such methods to create pressure against a project. Often, First Nations are a part of 
these processes and work together for the common goal of stopping a project. This does not 
mean that social licence applies to them. Even as they stand together on the common goal 
of stopping a project, First Nations as rights holders have greater rights and more say than 
stakeholders. Many stakeholders believe that First Nations can actually stop a project based 
on their rights and have come to rely on them to do so and strongly support them. 
28 [39] Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Decision Statement,” Feb. 25, 2014.
29 [38] Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Report of the Federal Review Panel: New Prosperity Gold-Copper 
Mine Project,” Oct. 31, 2013. 
30 National Energy Board Act R.S.C., 1985, c. N-7.
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Enbridge’s Northern Gateway is an example of a project that has had public opposition, 
which could be indicative of the project lacking social licence.31 Groups opposed include 
several First Nations, environmental groups and unions.32 Celebrities such as Jane Fonda 
and Neil Young have publicly condemned the development of the pipeline.33 The towns 
of Prince Rupert, Terrace, Smithers and Kitimat have held referendums — the results of 
which were clear opposition to the pipeline being built near their respective communities.34 
Northern Gateway does not have First Nation consent and approximately 150 First Nations 
have spoken out against the project.35 Many First Nations appeared before the National 
Energy Board Joint Review Panel in opposition to the project. Even in the face of significant 
opposition from towns, individuals, environmental groups and First Nations,36 the panel 
recommended that the project proceed with 209 conditions. The recommendation with 
conditions was approved by the federal government despite disagreement by the province 
of B.C.37 Opposition to Northern Gateway has continued after federal approval, with several 
opponents funding the court challenges put forth by several First Nations.38 If Northern 
Gateway were to proceed with construction, it would likely be in the face of significant 
public opposition and protest. Many doubt that the Northern Gateway project will actually 
go ahead.
First Nations, citizens groups, environmental groups and interested people can unite in a 
common cause and so First Nations get drawn into the concept of social licence. Getting 
involved with other groups in communicating their issues with a development project does 
not in any way take away from a First Nation’s right to consent or to be consulted, nor does 
it prevent them from being part of the social licence actions of different groups of people. 
3.3.4. Consultations with Métis People
The law relating to consultation with Métis people is not as developed as that of First 
Nations. Who is Métis, what their rights are, and whether Métis people are under the 
jurisdiction of the federal or provincial government are still being determined by the courts. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. vs. Powley,39 dealt with the Métis community around 
Sault St. Marie and determined that they have a right to hunt and gave guidelines for other 
Métis across Canada on how to prove a right to hunt.
31 See [51] M. Chisholm, “Former BC Hydro CEO condemns Condemns Enbridge’s ‘Bogus Economics’” at Joint Review 
Panel,” Vancouver Observer, Jan. 15, 2013; [144] G. Hoekstra, “Majority of British Columbians Ooppose Northern Gateway 
Pipeline: Poll,” Vancouver Sun, Feb. 5, 2014; [217] T. Orton, “BC Nature Files Legal Challenge Against Enbridge’s Northern 
Gateway Pipeline,” Business in Vancouver, July 13, 2014.
32 [249] Sierra Club BC, “Opposition to Enbridge Grows since Federal Approval,” press release, June 15, 2015.
33 [49] CBC News, “Neil Young Calls Pipeline Issues ‘Scabs on People’s Lives’,” Nov. 10, 2014.
34 [241] R. Rowland, “Kitimat residents Residents Vote ‘No’ in Pipeline Plebiscite,” The Globe and Mail, April 13, 2014.
35 [278] “First Nations who Oppose Enbridge,” Watershed Sentinel.
36 [112] D. Gillis, “Enbridge Won’t Take ‘No’ for an Answer, Despite 96% Opposition,” June 18, 2013, The Common Sense 
Canadian, June 18, 2013.
37 [48] CBC News, “Northern Gateway Pipeline Approved: B.C. Reacts,” June 11, 2014.
38 [249] Sierra Club BC, “Opposition to Enbridge Grows…”
39 [233] R. v. Powley, 2003 SCC 43.
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The other defining case dealing with Métis people is Daniels vs. Canada40 that went to 
both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. The main issue before 
the courts was whether Métis and non-status Indians are “Indians” as the term is used 
within section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The plaintiff Métis asked the court 
for a declaration that they are owed a duty to be consulted in good faith respecting their 
rights, interest and needs as Aboriginal peoples. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
declaration that “Indian” is “a broad term referring to all Indigenous peoples in Canada”, 
but declared that there was no “practical utility” in issuing the other declarations relating 
to fiduciary duty and the duty to consult, as those questions “would be a restatement of the 
existing law” [60].
Métis rights are in the process of being defined by courts, but if a group of Métis peoples 
can fall under the definition of Métis, and show they have rights that may be negatively 
impacted by a proposed project, they should be consulted.41 As an example, the government 
of Alberta’s policy on consultation with Métis communities, states the following:
“Alberta recognizes a duty to consult with some Métis communities when Crown land 
management and resource development decisions may adversely impact their traditional 
uses. The Province currently does not have a Métis consultation policy but has put in 
place an internal process to guide consultation with Métis communities on a case-by-
case basis where there is a credible assertion of Métis Aboriginal rights. Any policy 
developed with Métis will be consistent with The Government of Alberta’s Policy on 
Consultation with First Nations on Land and Natural Resource Management, 2013” [3].
One could conclude that some Métis would fall under the right to be consulted and others 
would fall under social licence, determined by whether they are legally defined as Métis 
and whether their rights, if any, will be negatively impacted. Until a more thorough 
definition of Métis rights is determined, it is likely that decisions regarding Métis rights will 
be on a case-by-case basis.
3.3.5. Inuit Right to Consultation
The Inuit who live within Nunavut negotiated a land claims agreement with the government 
of Canada that defined their rights.42 The preamble of this agreement states that the 
objective of the land claims agreement is “to provide for certainty and clarity of rights to 
ownership and use of lands and resources, and of rights for Inuit to participate in decision-
making concerning the use, management and conservation of land, water and resources, 
including the offshore; [and] to provide Inuit with wildlife harvesting rights and rights to 
participate in decision-making concerning wildlife harvesting.”
This land claim agreement is protected under s. 35 of the Constitution Act. The agreement 
sets out when the Inuit will be consulted through various sections of the agreement. In 
particular, article 27 talks of consultation on natural resources, which includes petroleum, 
40 [60] Daniels v. Canada, 2016 SCC 12.
41 [185] Métis Nation of Ontario, “Part 3: Establishing a Métis Right — The Powley Test,” http://www.Métisnation.org/
harvesting/the-powley-story/establishing-a-Métis-right---the-powley-test 
42 [119] Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 29.
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other resources, and existing subsurface rights. There is also a list that outlines what the 
Inuit have the right to be consulted on, which includes hiring, labour relations, business 
opportunities, safety, health and hygiene, protection and conservation of archeological sites, 
environmental concerns, disruption of wildlife, information flow and liaison between Inuit 
and proponents regarding project management, participation and concerns. Throughout 
the agreement, there are many boards, which the Inuit are a part of, that are established for 
water, wildlife, land, and resource management. Similar to First Nations, the Inuit would 
have rights under this agreement that would take them outside of social licence, as they 
have defined rights to be consulted under their final agreement.
The Inuit of Labrador also entered into a land claims agreement with the government of 
Canada and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Newfoundland and Labrador.43 The right 
to be consulted is laid out in various chapters related to natural resources. In particular, 
chapter 5 provides for consultation on ocean management. Section 5.6.7 requires the need 
for an impact benefit agreement before any major development. Chapter 10 sets out how 
land use planning will be done. As with the Inuit of Nunavut, the Inuit of Labrador have 
specific legal rights on any proposed energy developments that would be more than social 
licence. 
The Inuit of Quebec are part of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Land Claim 
Agreement with the governments of Canada and Quebec.44 Chapters 22 and 23 are the main 
chapters that set out how any development shall occur with the Cree and Inuit people who 
are within the claim area. Their right to be consulted is very specific in an agreement that is 
protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, which goes beyond social licence.
3.3.6. International Law and Free, Prior and Informed Consent
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Indigenous Rights45 was adopted in 2007. 
This declaration is not a legally binding document but does set international norms for state 
conduct. The concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is utilized in articles 10, 
11, 28, 29 and 32. Article 32 is in regards to development on lands, which reads:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
the development of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and co-operate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent prior to the approval of any project, affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. [emphasis added]
43 [118] Land Claims Agreement Between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. 
44 [121] Government of Canada, “The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.”
45 [269] United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” March 2008.
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3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such 
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
The other articles relate to receiving indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them: no relocation; redress and restitution for any cultural, intellectual, religious and 
spiritual property taken without their FPIC; nor any storage or disposal of hazardous 
material on indigenous people’s lands without their FPIC.
First Nations people in Canada have been pursuing the implementation of the term “free, 
prior and informed consent” as it pertains to any development within their territories and 
the use of their resources. The United Nations has been encouraging countries to have 
new legislation and mechanisms for dialogue with indigenous peoples, but admits that the 
“Promise of the Declaration is far from being universally fulfilled … Rights of indigenous 
peoples are frequently the first victims of development activities in indigenous lands, often 
pursued with no regard to the principle of free, prior and informed consent …” [270]. The 
mechanism of free, prior and informed consent is not one that has been implemented within 
Canada, but by international law standards, it has been accepted as the norm. Comparing 
and contrasting free, prior and informed consent with social licence also shows how strong 
internationally recognized rights of indigenous peoples are as compared with social licence.
Whether it is through national or international law, indigenous rights are critical to whether 
projects can be developed in their territories and these rights go far beyond social licence. 
Indigenous rights are at the core or root of every project in Canada that has to consider 
the impacts on the way of life, constitutionally protected rights and title of the Aboriginal 
people within Canada. If Aboriginal people are part of social licence, it can only be 
considered in addition to their rights.
3.4. Why has the term “Social Licence” Emerged?
In the exploration of social licence and public acceptance, the question of why the term 
“social licence” emerged is important to explore to put the issue in context. The term 
“social licence” has become known as a way to describe the public’s acceptance or 
opposition of development projects or industries in their local area. The context in which 
the term is used is rapidly changing and is described in many ways, as described in section 
3.1 above and in the media.46 In the most basic sense, people have become concerned with 
what is happening in their area or in proximity to where they live or work and the potential 
effects on their quality of life, including health and safety concerns, economic benefits and 
costs, and environmental and social impacts. The various phrases used have evolved with a 
need to further describe what the role of the public is in the development process. 
Broad opposition to projects dates back at least as far as 1971 when the Don’t Make a Wave 
Committee (later Greenpeace) in Vancouver sent a ship to Amchitka, Alaska to oppose 
46 [45] D. Cayo, “Demand for ‘Social Licence’ Stems from Distrust of Private and Public Institutions,” Calgary Herald,  
Dec. 10, 2014.
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U.S. testing of nuclear devices.47 At this time, the term “social licence” was not in use. In 
the past, social licence could have been referred to as NIMBYism, or not-in-my-backyard 
syndrome (discussed in section 3.1.3). Peter Sandman states that “NIMBY” was used in 
print for the first time in 1980 in the Christian Science Monitor [245]. Another source states 
NIMBY was coined in the 1980s by British politician Nicholas Ridley, and was used to 
“describe citizens that oppose proposed real estate developments in their neighborhood or 
town” [205].
According to Sandman, NIMBY is defined thusly: “The purest, most literal example of 
the NIMBY attitude is opposition to something that virtually everyone (including the 
opponents) agrees ought to be built somewhere, but virtually everyone would prefer not 
to live near it. Examples include airports, jazz clubs, superhighways, slaughterhouses, 
prisons, and wind farms. These are all developments that offer significant benefits to the 
overall community at the possible expense of their nearest neighbors. They bring with them 
noise, odour, pollution, traffic, crime, or other undesirable side-effects. Opposing them is 
certainly not irrational, though it is demonstrably selfish (that is, rationally self-interested)” 
[245]. Sandman also uses the term NIABY, not-in-anyone’s-backyard, where there is 
total opposition to a type of project. An example of this is those who are opposed to the 
expansion of the oil sands, or pipelines and tankers. Social licence can be argued to be a 
combination of both NIMBY and NIABY, as NIMBY is too narrow of a definition.
As outlined above, the phrase “social licence to operate” was coined in the late 1990s by 
Canadian mining executive Jim Cooney and has continued to be used in many contexts 
since.48 What “social licence” actually means has been the topic of much discussion. It is 
has been used often since the late 1990s. The more it is used, the more the concept becomes 
ingrained in our everyday lives. The phrase “social licence” is being used by natural 
resource project proponents, politicians, policy-makers, ENGOs, the public and media.49 
It is now being used broadly by industry as well as the public. This is reflected in an 
opinion piece by Nigel Bankes: “While one would expect the concept to be enthusiastically 
endorsed by elements of civil society it is perhaps more surprising to see industry broadly 
endorsing the concept, including pipeline companies, industry associations (e.g., the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) and Canadian Energy Pipeline 
Association (CEPA)) and even some regulators” [12]. As well, the term “corporate social 
responsibility” is sometimes referred to as the same or similar to the social licence to 
operate by companies themselves.50
47 [130] Greenpeace, “History & Mission.”
48 For example, see [12] N. Bankes, “The Social Licence to Operate: Mind the Gap,” ABlawg, June 24, 2015; [190] 
MiningFacts.org, “What is the Social Licence to Operate (SLO)?,”; and [203] D. Newman, “Be Careful What You Wish 
For: Why Some Versions of ‘Social Licence’ are Unlicenced and May Be Anti-Social,” Macdonald Laurier Institute 
Commentary, November 2014.
49 See [160] C. Kennedy, “Snap Shot: How Some Industry Players are using the Phrase ‘SOCIAL LICENCE’,” Feb. 27, 2015.
50 
See [35] Business Council of British Columbia, “Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A Concept in Search of Definition 
and Boundaries,” Environment and Energy Bulletin, 7 (2) May 2015.
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The emergence of the term “social licence” has been described in a paper from New 
Zealand’s Sustainable Business Council as arising from such things as [257]:
• “Society’s confidence in business has been shaken. The global financial crisis … a 
massive destruction of personal wealth, and unemployment at historically high levels 
called into question the right of business to operate in such an apparently uncontrolled 
and unregulated manner”;
• “A series of environmental disasters such as the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill and 
human rights issues … in the Bangladesh garment manufacturing industry … 
undermine confidence that business would do the right thing if left to its own 
devices”;
• “Global consumers have greater expectations for the role companies should play in 
giving back to society and addressing social and environmental issues”;
• “Technological advances mean that information on a company can spread fast. NGOs 
are getting more active about ranking and publicizing business performance and will 
target particular companies and particular issues by organizing consumer boycotts.”
Issues such as greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, and the potential effects of 
projects on the quality of water and air, are all reasons affecting why a term like social 
licence has emerged and is used so widely. Katherine Teh-White, the managing director of 
Futureye, a Melbourne-based management consultancy, said quite plainly that the period of 
community apathy and acceptance is over [260].
3.5. Measuring Social Licence and Social Acceptance
This section describes explicit attempts to measure social licence. Rather than an 
exhaustive overview of the work in this area, we have tried to be indicative of the work that 
has been done. While several notable attempts have been made, on the whole, considerable 
work remains to be done to improve the validity and reliability of such measures. Our 
review is not intended as an endorsement of these measurement techniques, but to give an 
overview of extant attempts. 
Additionally, as our review makes clear, prior work has focused on measuring social licence 
in mining projects; to our knowledge, there are no attempts to measure social licence per se 
in the context of energy projects. Keeping this context in mind is important; the substantial 
differences between mining and energy projects could limit the usability of this section to 
most readers. In particular, the mining projects in question had mainly local effects and 
tended to take place in less-developed countries, whereas the discourse around energy 
projects in Canada has focused on local effects, impacts on climate change from energy 
development, and the legitimacy and fairness of the regulatory process. While measurement 
of social licence in the context of mining may not help in improving our understanding of 
the term as it applies to energy projects, it is still important to consider.
Although some have lamented that social licence to operate is intangible [261], as with any 
social scientific concept numerous measurement options exist. Of course, how to measure 
something depends on the definition of the construct in question. For instance, because 
the pyramid model, as described in section 3.1.1, assumes that “social licence has levels” 
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[24], its proponents have attempted to demonstrate these levels empirically. In particular, 
the latest version of the pyramid model was reportedly inspired by Minera San Cristobal, 
a lead, silver and zinc mine in Bolivia [29]. The authors tracked changes in social capital 
during a 14-year period from 1994 to 2008 (see Figure 4), using “historical documents and 
the experience of persons who had been present throughout the life of the project using a 
basket of indicators and then verified through interviews with community members” [261].
In 2009, the authors devised “a pool of two dozen statements intended to measure the social 
licence to operate in interviews with mine stakeholders in Bolivia … However, the subsets 
of statements meant to measure the separate layers of the social licence to operate did not 
display the cumulative nature hypothesized by Thomson and Boutilier [2011]” [261]. In 
light of these findings, in 2010 the authors revised the pool of questions for use in Mexico 
and Australia. Finally, in 2011, a set of 15 revised items was tested, again at the Minera San 
Cristobal mine. The 15 statements loaded on four factors, which the authors interpreted 
as economic legitimacy, socio-political legitimacy, interactional trust and institutionalized 
trust. 
FIGURE 4 SOCIAL CAPITAL AT THE SAN CRISTOBAL MINE, 1994-2008
Source: p. 1792 of [261] I. Thomson and R. Boutilier, “Social Licence to Operate,” SME Mining Engineering Handbook, 3rd 
edition, edited by P. Darling, (Englewood, CO: Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration, 2011), 1779-1796.
According to the authors, 85 per cent of cases conformed to a modified cumulative scale. 
For instance, stakeholders with a high score on the institutionalized trust factor “will 
always have high scores on all the other factors” [29]. Conversely, stakeholders with low 
scores on the socio-political legitimacy factor and the interactional trust factor “will never 
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have high scores on institutionalized trust” [261]. Similarly, stakeholders with low scores 
on the economic legitimacy factor “will never have high scores on any of the other factors” 
[261]. 
Relative to the pyramid model, several points are noteworthy. First, contrary to the 
hypothesized model, Boutilier and Thomson [29] find no evidence for credibility as a 
separate factor between legitimacy and trust. Instead, they argue that socio-political 
legitimacy and interaction trust form a middle ground between mere economic legitimacy 
on the one hand, and institutionalized trust on the other hand. Second, neither Boutilier 
and Thomson [29] nor Black [24] provide any evidence for the reliability or validity of their 
specific questionnaire items or factor labels. Further work is needed to demonstrate whether 
the four factors they have found reliably and validly assess their proposed constructs. Third, 
the case study of the Minera San Cristobal mine introduces further conceptual slippage. 
Specifically, they claimed to measure “the ups and downs of social capital” [261]. But 
no justification is given for the subsequent conflation of social capital and social licence. 
Fourth, Boutilier and Thomson [29] interpret their factors as cumulative. Namely, they 
argue that institutionalized trust depends upon the presence of their other three factors. 
Or, more generally, that legitimacy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trust. 
But to the extent that social licence is defined as legitimacy, then Boutilier and Thomson’s 
proposed measures would appear to have limited construct validity [9, 25]. 
More recently, Black proposed measuring the pyramid model using 14 statements (see  
Table 6), which are rated on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 represents strong 
disagreement and 5 represents strong agreement: “To calculate a social licence score, 
calculate the mean of each stakeholder’s responses to the group of questions. If you have 
many stakeholders you could group them into categories that make sense, for example, 
local government, environmental action groups, and so on” [24]. Additionally, Black 
recommends examining the standard deviation in the scores within the categories: “Wide 
variation suggests an ‘average’ score might be hiding some important differences between 
stakeholders that would be useful to know about for developing strategies.” Additionally, 
when grouping stakeholders, it is necessary to identify criteria so that the differences 
between the groups are bigger than the differences within the groups. According to Black 
these social licence measures have been used with around 5,000 stakeholders in 60 projects.
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TABLE 6 QUESTIONS FOR MEASURING SOCIAL LICENCE AS DEFINED BY THE PYRAMID MODEL
Item Statement
1 We can gain from a relationship with [name of company].
2 We need to have the co-operation of [name of company] to reach our most important goals.
3 We are very satisfied with our relations with [name of company].
4 [Name of company] does what is says it will do in its relations with our organization.
5 The presence of [name of company] is a benefit to us.
6 [Name of company] listens to us.
7 In the long term, [name of company] makes a contribution to the well-being of the entire region.
8 [Name of company] treats everyone fairly.
9 [Name of company] respects our way of doing things.
10 Our organization and [name of company] have a similar vision for the future of this region. 
11 [Name of company] gives more support to those whom it negatively affects.
12 [Name of company] shares decision-making with us.
13 [Name of company] takes account of our interests.
14 [Name of company] openly shares information that is relevant to us.
Source: [24] L. Black, The Social Licence to Operate: Your Management Framework for Complex Times, (London: Do 
Sustainability, 2013).
Starting in 2010, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO), Australia’s national science agency (akin to Canada’s NSERC), began studying 
social licence.51 Specifically, as part of its Mineral Resources Flagship program, CSIRO 
offers contract-based research to clients in business, industry and government regarding 
“social licence to operate.”52 CSIRO takes the concept of social licence as its starting point. 
But rather than imposing one definition or another, CSIRO has conducted a series of studies 
as to how different stakeholder groups define the concept. 
For instance, in a recent paper, Parsons and Moffat, two researchers from CSIRO, 
investigated how the mining industry constructed the meaning of social licence [221]. They 
began by collecting 62 sustainability reports published by 19 companies between 2006 
and 2009. Within these reports, they identified 133 mentions of the terms social licence, 
social licence to operate and licence to operate. First, they analyzed the role of actors 
and agency within these mentions. In 111 instances, agency was either implicit or absent, 
making it unclear who is acting or facilitating action: “This vagueness suggests that social 
licence is essentially a metaphorical and rhetorical notion, bearing little resemblance to 
a licence in the legal sense.” To further explore this possibility, they next analyzed the 
material processes associated with social licence. Specifically, they identified 121 instances 
where companies referred to acquiring (n = 32), maintaining (n = 83) or losing (n = 6) a 
social licence. Interestingly, the authors note that “no company discusses the prospect or 
consequences of failing to acquire a social licence.” 
In the same paper, Parsons and Moffat repeated their analysis using proceedings from a 
mining industry conference with the theme “sustaining our social licence.” They found 
30 mentions of social licence across 40 presentations and 35 abstracts. These mentions 
51 The earliest CSIRO publication on “social licence” in the CSIRO Research Publications Repository is a presentation at the 
Sustainable Mining conference in Kalgoorlie, WA, Australia, Aug. 17-19, 2010.
52 [56] CSIRO, “Social Licence to Operate,” March 1, 2015.
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were distributed unevenly. Mining companies represented 38 per cent of the speakers, and 
47 per cent of the mentions; governments represented eight per cent of the speakers, and 
20 per cent of the mentions; research institutions represented 18 per cent of the speakers, 
and seven per cent of mentions; and indigenous organizations represented eight per 
cent of the speakers, but none of the mentions. Thus, “social licence discourse has been 
adopted disproportionately within industry and government.” As with the sustainability 
reports, agency was implied or missing in 28 out of the 30 mentions, and only processes 
of acquiring (n = 10) or maintaining (n = 20) a social licence were discussed. Overall, they 
conclude: 
“Since not possessing a social licence appears to be almost inconceivable, the state of 
possessing a social licence becomes the default position. The burden of proof that a 
company does not hold a social licence seems to lie with a host community, broader 
society or some other stakeholder group. Since a social licence is so vague and 
intangible, it is relatively difficult to prove its absence, and relatively easy to assert and 
assume that one exists. Thus, the common argument that minerals companies today 
must hold a social licence may not confer a particularly onerous burden, and may not 
comprise the shift in power relations that the notion intuitively suggests” [221].
Whereas Boutilier et al [28] discussed how mining companies might use the pyramid 
model for instrumental purposes, namely acquiring and maintaining a social licence for 
their operations, Bice [22] investigated the extent to which mining company conceptions 
of social licence were (mis)aligned with the pyramid model. For instance, she studied how 
important social licence was from the company’s perspective; whether, in their opinion, 
companies held a social licence or not; and how this had changed, if at all, over time. To do 
so, Bice conducted both content and discourse analyses of the 18 sustainability reports from 
five major Australian mining companies. Her analysis revealed that explicit discussion of 
social issues, as a percentage of all issues discussed, had almost quadrupled between the 
years 2004 to 2007. The author concluded that while social licence is certainly important 
to the examined companies, how they go about determining if they have obtained it or not 
remains unclear. 
In another CSIRO study, researchers focused on how mining companies engage with local 
communities, and how these processes affect the extent of their social licence to operate 
[191]. Broadly speaking, Moffat and Zhang proposed that company practices influenced 
trust, which in turn influenced approval and acceptance. In other words, they reversed the 
relationship between legitimacy and trust assumed by the pyramid model such that trust 
is antecedent to acceptance and approval (legitimacy). To test their model, they conducted 
two surveys. The participants included local residents living in the areas affected by 
an Australian coal seam gas operation (CSG, also known as coalbed methane) and not 
employed in the industry. They were recruited from a stakeholder database provided by 
a CSG company, and invited to complete a survey via the Internet. Both surveys asked 
questions on the impact on social infrastructure, contact quantity and quality with the 
company, procedural fairness, trust and acceptance. They found that impacts on social 
infrastructure, contact quality and perceived procedural fairness were correlated with trust, 
which was in turn correlated with acceptance.
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According to Lacey and Lamont, numbers can be equivocal [165]. For instance, in their 
study of coal seam gas development in Queensland, Australia, they found that industry 
proponents claimed it had a social licence on the basis of its success in securing more than 
4,000 landholder access agreements. However, they note that “While individual contracts 
are necessary for negotiating the terms of company behaviour and responsibility when 
accessing private property for their activities, in and of themselves, they do not constitute 
evidence of the broader-based social agreement … Rather, there are many people, including 
those in distal communities, who do not hold land affected by CSG development but who 
are democratically entitled to express their views … Thus, it cannot be reliably concluded 
that 4,000 individual contracts provides an industry with a social licence.”
Although these different efforts to measure social licence are no doubt interesting, more 
recently Owen and Kemp have criticized the mining industry’s use of social licence for 
depending on a “circular logic” [218]. On their account, the concept is invoked by industry 
in an effort to demonstrate that it has met stakeholder expectations, whether or not it 
actually has responded to stakeholders’ specific expectations. But companies and their 
stakeholders “invariably have different expectations.” As a result, “social licence can be 
used to mask the gap between company and stakeholder expectations … the industry’s use 
of the term is interpreted here as an effort to disguise or silence opposition.”
3.6. Social Licence and Social Acceptance in the Context of Energy Projects
The term “energy project” encompasses energy production from fossil fuel and renewable 
sources, as well as transportation infrastructure, yet both types of projects may invoke 
support or opposition for a range of different reasons. The term “social licence” has been 
attributed to some degree as the gatekeeper, with the power to influence having the greatest 
impact on the success or failure of energy projects. The term has been used when referring 
to both traditional and renewable energy projects; however, much of the attention and 
literature relating to social licence can be attributed to both renewable and nonrenewable 
energy. The government of New Brunswick, in its announcement to form a commission to 
address hydraulic fracturing, announced that a moratorium will exist unless certain criteria 
are met, the first one identified as “social licence” in order to proceed.53 Alternatively, 
a natural gas power plant project planned for Middletown, Ohio, appears to be finding 
support: the $500 million US project is expected to create 400 local jobs.54
3.6.1. Renewable Energy Projects
The key drivers for the adoption of renewable energy are climate change and energy 
security. Climate change mitigation is a global concern with intergovernmental agreements 
in place to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the recent Paris agreement. Energy 
security has the potential to impact economic growth and is affected by fossil fuel reserves, 
fluctuations in fuel process and uncertainty of supply. Although public opinion relating 
53 See [125] Government of New Brunswick, “Government Introduces Moratorium on Hydraulic Fracturing in New 
Brunswick, press release, Dec. 18, 2014. 
54 See [182] R. McCrabb, “$500M Natural Gas Plant Planned for Middletown,” Dayton Daily News, Jan. 28, 2014.
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to renewable energy is reported in much of the literature to be supportive of the general 
concept of “green energy” and the inherent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, there 
appears to be a significant disconnect when it comes to implementation, or community 
acceptance: the social gap, as described in section 3.1.3. This also seems to be true across 
geographical and technological boundaries with reports of support and opposition in many 
countries, which also span type and scale of energy project; wind, tidal, solar, biomass, 
geothermal, tidal and transmission scale, such as a multi-megawatt wind farm to local 
distributed or even residential developments. 
Wind energy projects, and their success and failure, have arguably received the most 
attention in academic literature, perhaps due to the global growth in wind energy 
development in recent years.55 Significant research has been undertaken to address 
opposition to wind projects and to understand the motivation behind it [86]. Devine-Wright 
argues of the need for empirical research and proposes a multidimensional framework 
that transcends localized opposition, known colloquially as NIMBYism [70]. Wolsink 
considers public attitudes in Europe and identifies equity and fairness, not-in-my-backyard 
or NIMBY motives [288]. Cass and Walker consider emotion as a key psychological 
characteristic, which they suggest may impact the rational planning process [44]. Graham 
et al. [128], when evaluating public perception, did not identify a relationship between 
proximity and opposition to a proposal, but instead propose a wider range of factors 
influencing opposition, expanding Devine-Wright’s [71] proposed framework. 
Wind power, for example, is a major contributor to the provision of electricity from 
renewable energy and as of June 2014 has 337 GW of installed wind capacity in over 100 
countries, meeting four per cent of the world’s electricity requirements.56 The European 
Union by the end of 2014 had 133.9 GW of installed wind energy capacity, with the four 
main leaders identified as Germany (39 GW), Spain (22.9 GW), United Kingdom (12.4 
GW) and France (9.3 GW).57 Denmark, with 4.8 GW of generation capacity was able 
to meet 39 per cent of its electricity requirements in 2014.58 The U.S. has over 48,000 
turbines, equating to 65.8 GW of installed wind capacity59 and Canada has 9.7 GW of 
installed capacity supplying approximately five per cent of Canada’s electricity demand. 
The evidence suggests that wind energy is big business and is experiencing sustained 
and significant growth on a global basis. Although projects are moving ahead, challenges 
still exist when addressing the need for public acceptance, or legitimacy as described in 
the pyramid model, and one must consider if common themes exist between projects that 
receive support and those that experience opposition, as a function of geography, size and 
type of technology. 
Acquiring social licence or public acceptance can often be difficult, and when it is not 
acquired can result in the cancellation of projects. Jami and Walsh provide an interesting 
case study on the Blue Highlands wind project in The Blue Mountains, Ontario [152]. 
55 See [290] World Wind Energy Association, “New Record in Worldwide Wind Installations,” 2015.
56 See [289] World Wind Energy Association, 2014. World Wind Resource Assessment Report. WWEA Technical Paper Series 
(TP-01-14).
57 See [91] European Wind Energy Association, 2015. Wind in Power: 2014 European statistics.
58 See [106] K. Garus, “Denmark Breaks its Own Wind Record,” Sun and Wind Energy Magazine, 2015. 
59 See [7] American Wind Energy Association, 2015, “Wind Energy facts at a Glance.”
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Brookfield Power, the project developer, proposed a two-phase, 77-wind-turbine project, 
including necessary support utilities, to be constructed in the town of The Blue Mountains. 
Phase 1 of the project was a 50 MW wind farm, which was to begin construction in 2006 
and be fully operational by March 2007, designed to meet the energy demands of 10,000 
homes in the surrounding area. However, the project encountered over two years of delays 
due to opposition from the local community and as a result, Brookfield Power cancelled the 
project as it could not be completed within the timelines stipulated in the energy purchase 
contract. 
This is not the only wind project in Ontario to be cancelled. Kingsbridge II in Goderich, 
Huron County, was also abandoned when faced with similar opposition. Research of host 
communities for wind farms by Baxter et al. found a majority of residents opposed to 
proposed projects in certain cases [17]. Concerns over health risks and landscape impacts 
are the strongest predictors of opposition. These concerns have been exacerbated by a 
narrowing of the requirements for community engagement by developers. Major wind 
projects are now subject to lengthy appeals by opponents to the provincial Environmental 
Review Tribunal, which not only introduce additional project financial costs but also foster 
socially costly community division [276].
While recognizing the disadvantages of public involvement in the energy project decision-
making process, Jami and Walsh also comment on several possible benefits [152]. Involving 
the public in the decision-making process benefits public officials, as it places responsibility 
and accountability on the citizens and reduces the likelihood of unpopular policies. The 
authors even go so far as to say that it is necessary in “achieving the key principle of a 
democratic society to acknowledge the basic human rights regarding democracy and 
procedural justice.”  
Dusyk states that public involvement has the benefits of “the possibility of creating new, 
potentially more robust, forms of knowledge and helping to shape individual and collective 
identities” [83], citing a number of other authors including Fischer [97], Healey [138], 
Callon et al. [36], and Whatmore [285]. Dusyk examines the case of hydroelectricity in 
British Columbia, more specifically the Site C proposal on the Peace River. While the 
project was originally pitched in the early 1980s, it was delayed and then cancelled in a 
similar manner to the wind projects discussed above. Dusyk states that the proposal of 
the project was a “learning opportunity for opponents of the project” and it “created a 
contingent of local residents who familiarized themselves with the issues and with effective 
forms of intervention.” Interest in the project has resurfaced in recent years, but much of the 
public or their children who protested the proposal still live in the area, and there has been 
“a knowledge and cultural accumulation around Site C,” which Dusyk says has translated to 
intelligent and informed advocacy.   
Canada is not the only country to experience delays in wind projects. New Zealand has 19 
wind farms, either in operation or under construction, amounting to five per cent of New 
Zealand’s electricity generation capacity. There are 12 proposed additional farms, all of 
which have received regulatory approval, or consent to proceed; eight of these received 
consent following reviews as a result of opposition. Graham et al. published a case study 
based on three, at the time, proposed wind energy projects in New Zealand, at Whitehill, 
Hayes and Mahinerangi, all of which received regulatory approval or consent to build [128]. 
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Whitehill proceeded with 90 per cent and 80 per cent public support (measured by opinion 
polls) from local and non-local residents respectively, yet Hayes and Mahinerangi were 
under appeal at the time of paper submission. Interestingly, Hayes received over 60 per cent 
support from local residents and less than 50 per cent by non-local residents. Mahinerangi 
received overwhelming opposition, with just under 90 per cent of local residents opposed 
and approximately 70 per cent of non-local residents opposed. A recent review of New 
Zealand’s wind farms, as published by the New Zealand Wind Energy Association indicates 
that Hayes was never built, yet Mahinerangi was commissioned in 2011.60
Jobert et al. present examples of three successful projects in France and two in Germany, 
where again public support was assumed but social support at a local level was described 
as a challenge [154]. The authors choose a different approach and instead of using opinion 
polls to assess support, analyzed how implementation programs were constructed to 
understand why projects were supported or not, using the behaviour of stakeholders 
during the implementation phase as a guide. The authors indicate that trust, identified 
as the final boundary in the pyramid model, is one of the greatest barriers to gaining 
public support, something that was overcome in Germany by creating specific zones for 
wind development projects. Wind turbine development was given privileged status, yet 
communities were allowed to participate in the regulation and location of these zones. The 
authors report, however, that this trust has been eroded by overconfident and demanding 
developers. In France, a lack of stringent regulatory processes at the time of analysis led to 
procedural issues that often added confusion to public opinion. In all five cases, however, 
the projects were implemented. The authors conclude that a wider range of factors need to 
be considered, which they list as visual impact, ownership, information and participation 
along with local integration of the developer, the creation of network support and access to 
ownership.
Raven et al. provide a comparative analysis of 27 new energy projects in Europe, 
encompassing energy efficiency, bioenergy, wind, solar, hydrogen, geothermal and CO2 
capture and storage [235]. The authors identify five crucial challenges and propose a six-
step methodology for facilitating societal acceptance for new and ongoing energy projects.
A wealth of published literature relates to energy economics, which tends to target the 
feasibility of projects, relating project costs and revenue to technology and ultimately 
resource availability, in an attempt to answer the question, “Is this renewable project 
economically feasible at this location, at this scale, given this resource?” [18, 146, 173, 
196, 246]. Such analysis has been expanded to encompass ownership models, policy, 
and incentives such as feed-in tariffs and taxes. Despite the development of feed-in tariff 
policies globally and their impact on implementation, industry sectors, land use and 
environmental protection [59, 169, 195, 219], a recent study in Germany questions whether 
such policies actually cause innovation to stagnate [206].
In the case of tidal energy development, there are obvious first-to-market advantages. 
Uncertainties are reduced for investors, insurers and future project developers. Front-
runners can also often establish industry standards and impact subsequent project design. 
However, risks are often the greatest for front-runners given a lack of standard operating 
60 See [202] New Zealand Wind Energy Association, Wind Farms Operating and Under Construction, 2015.
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procedures, a nascent supply chain, a lack of specialized infrastructure, and often 
community resistance [179]. Benefits can accrue from delaying energy projects, especially 
when projects involve new technology. Benefits from delay for tidal energy projects, 
especially for competitors who are not the front-runners, can include increased investor 
confidence as technology is improved, a regulatory process developed to address tidal 
energy development, and increased stakeholder awareness and confidence in the ability of 
developers and regulators to address their concerns.
Most renewable projects have time constraints from approval to implementation. Renewable 
projects are capital-intensive, large-scale civil engineering projects and have significant 
front-end costs; those associated with resources assessment, access, connectivity and 
meeting regulatory requirements such as environmental assessment. Failure to comply 
within the time constraint can result in the loss of regulatory approval or permission to 
proceed with significant financial implications.
3.6.2. Fossil Fuel Projects
Bowness and Hudson examine the outcomes of hearings held regarding citizens’ concerns 
pertaining to oil sands projects in Alberta [30]. Of the 24 hearings that took place between 
2005 and 2011, one resulted in withdrawal of a project, three resulted in amendments to 
project proposals (mostly additional monitoring requirements), and seven were settled 
outside of the hearings through negotiations between proponents and intervenors, so the 
resulting amendments are not publicly available. The rest of the hearings ruled in favour of 
the project proponents and so no changes were made. 
Examining Quebec’s Utica Shale, Rivard et al. found public involvement resulted in a de 
facto moratorium, rendering exploration projects by Talisman, Junex, Gastem and Forest 
Oil useless for the time being (the moratorium may stay in place up to 2018) [240]. In 
2009, shale gas protests began, and since then 30 local, and three provincial, protest groups 
have formed. Sixty-three municipalities have also announced motions against shale gas 
development. In 2010, public hearings were held, and in 2011, new strict regulations were 
announced that caused industry activities to cease and the de facto moratorium. 
Opposition causes delays, which will ultimately increase the cost associated with projects, 
reported by as much as 20 to 30 per cent in the case of coal stream gas exploration in 
Australia.61 A six-year delay in the Keystone XL pipeline has reportedly increased the cost 
of the project to $8 billion from $4.5 billion.62 A joint report by the Institute for Energy 
Economics and Financial Analysis and Oil Change International states that anti-oil-sands 
campaigns have cost the industry over $17 billion.63 
61 See [230] B. Potter, “Opposition to Energy Projects Could Push up Bills,” Australian Financial Review, 2014, Accessed 
April 16, 2015. 
62 See [193] G. Morgan, “Cost of Keystone XL has Jumped Nearly 50% During Six Years of Delays, says TransCanada CEO,” 
National Post, Nov. 4, 2014.
63 See [148] Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis, “Material Risks: How Public Accountability is Slowing Tar 
Sands Development,” 2014.
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The press has also captured the economic impact of project delays. The Huffington 
Post reported that Lone Pine Resources Inc. has brought a $250 million damage suit 
to a NAFTA panel against Canada due to the millions they lost because of the Quebec 
government’s moratorium on hydraulic fracturing.64 A Globe and Mail article claims that 
Imperial Oil Ltd. estimates the cost of the Mackenzie Valley Project has increased to $20 
billion (an increase of 40 per cent) after several years of legal and regulatory delays.65 Much 
of this delay was due to negotiations with public stakeholders.66
The negative impact on a project’s overall economic feasibility is true in many industries 
and has been the subject of significant research, as demonstrated by published literature. 
Fallahnejad addresses delays in traditional projects, specifically pipeline projects in Iran, 
referencing a range of other similar projects in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America 
[92]. Jergeas provides an analysis of cost overruns for oil sands projects in Alberta, but 
focuses on the pre-endorsement phases of such projects [153]. Although only some of this 
work acknowledges that delays can result from public opposition, much of the literature 
addresses delays caused by reasons other than opposition, such as poor management, site 
planning, design changes, design errors, weather, procurement, and labour issues, and in 
the identification and implementation of mitigation protocols [135, 211, 216, 244]. 
3.6.3. A Closer Look: Ontario’s Energy Regulatory Situation
Ontario’s energy regulatory situation features multiple oversight and planning bodies with 
differences between the natural gas67 and electricity sectors. In 1960, the Ontario Energy 
Board (OEB) was established as a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal charged with 
regulating the province’s natural gas sector in the public interest. Its structure is similar to 
that of the National Energy Board with appointed panel members who hold oral and written 
hearings. The OEB’s major focus is on ensuring fair pricing of energy commodities for 
consumers, with a lesser role in approving the siting of energy infrastructure. It reviews and 
approves changes to natural gas prices and regulates ownership changes and other aspects 
of market participants. 
The Board also reviews applications for pipeline construction and for construction of 
electricity transmission lines within the province; however, it has no role in the approval 
of the siting or construction of the wind energy generation facilities which have proven to 
be contentious and have introduced questions of social acceptance and social licence. The 
OEB is also not performing any review function on another topic that attracts public debate 
and opposition: that of the plan for $15 billion in upgrades to Ontario’s nuclear generating 
stations. 
The OEB’s role in the electricity sector expanded in the late 1990s when Ontario’s Crown 
corporation was restructured and broken into generating and transmission entities. 
64 See [21] J. Beltrame, “Quebec Fracking Ban Lawsuit Shows Perils Of Free Trade Deals: Critics,” Huffington Post, Oct. 3, 
2013. 
65 See [96] “Imperial Oil’s Mackenzie Pipeline Price Tag Swells to $20-Billion,” Financial Post, Dec. 24, 2013. 
66 See [155] J. Jones, “Mackenzie Valley’s New Price Tag: $20-Billion (and rising),” Globe and Mail, Dec. 23, 2013. 
67 As Ontario has limited production of natural gas, the Ontario Energy Board’s main function in regulating natural gas is in 
transmission and consumption, rather than production.
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However, the OEB role in electricity is limited by two major factors. First, its major 
function of setting rates is limited to only transmission and distribution charges and not 
procurement for a large portion of generated energy. It sets rates for purchase of only 
nuclear and hydro power produced by the Crown corporation, Ontario Power Generation, 
and not for other market participants. Second, the electricity sector has been a site of more 
rapid policy change and more purposeful interaction from the provincial government than 
the natural gas sector. 
The policy decisions taken under the Green Energy and Green Economy Act 2009 to 
prioritize solar, wind and other renewable sources of electricity came in the form of several 
ministerial directives to adjust rates and program rules. These decisions overrode long-
term energy plans of the Ontario Power Authority (OPA), which nominally had authority 
for overall electricity planning. In a 2011 report, the auditor general of Ontario remarked 
that this has created ambiguity over the mandate of the Ontario Energy Board to review 
and approve energy plans prepared by the OPA.68 For some critics this is haphazard and 
problematic [114]. Further changes arose in 2015, when the OPA and its procurement and 
planning activities merged with a separate entity, the Independent Electricity System 
Operator (IESO), which has responsibility for overseeing the electricity market.
Host community protests and the rise of a social movement against wind energy in 
Ontario have challenged the traditional scope of the public interest for Ontario’s energy 
regulators [17, 63, 142, 254]. For instance, the OEB’s primary goal is to “to ensure that 
the public good is served in a marketplace that is not competitive” [214]. The impetus 
for regulatory oversight is thus economic and not social, environmental or public-safety 
related. It is limited to addressing the natural monopoly position that electricity and natural 
gas providers occupy and to acting as a substitute for the economic forces that would 
normally influence them in a competitive market. Economic regulation is also designed 
to provide oversight of the markets to protect consumers. The OEB’s role as an economic 
regulator is to balance the interests of regulated entities and consumers” [214]. In contrast, 
the issues that are raised by host communities when new energy projects are developed 
are contextual, site-based and overwhelmingly based in environmental, public health and 
cultural (e.g., landscape and heritage) discourses.
For wind electricity generation in Ontario, these conflicting opinions and interest are 
regulated at two main points. First is the provincial authorities’ decision to enter into a 
contract to purchase the electricity produced by a wind-generation facility. This decision 
is made by the IESO (formerly OPA). From 2010 to 2015, contracts were awarded if 
proponents could meet basic requirements of technical and financial capacity. Proponents 
then proceed to carry out environmental, noise, cultural and other assessments along with 
a minimum of two public meetings to seek a renewable energy approval (REA) from the 
Ministry of the Environment, representing the second major point of regulation. 
Appeals of REA decisions are heard at the Environmental Review Tribunal, one of 
five tribunals and boards in the province that adjudicate on matters related to land use 
planning, environmental and heritage protection, property assessment, land valuation 
and other matters. Remarkably, all wind energy REAs issued from 2010 to 2015 have 
68 See [8] Auditor General of Ontario, 2011 Auditor General Report, 67-86.
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been appealed to the Environmental Review Tribunal, one successfully, a case which is 
now before Ontario’s Court of Appeal. In 2013, the ministry directed IESO and OPA to 
develop better ways to facilitate public engagement (opposition) with large renewable 
energy projects. The two bodies recommended better integration of the siting approval 
activities and the planning activities of government [215]. Now, new regional planning 
bodies involving municipalities and members of the public to consult on regional energy 
generation needs are being established. A second change is that IESO will require evidence 
of more community engagement from companies wishing to build wind energy projects 
prior to the offering of contracts. These changes arguably represent a significant expansion 
in the process and scope of defining and accommodating the public interest over energy in 
Ontario. 
3.6.4. Transferable Lessons from the Forestry Sector
The energy sector is not the only Canadian sector to face challenges of social acceptance 
and related broader criticisms that regulation is failing to ensure extractive activities are 
carried out in the public interest. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the forestry sector went 
through dramatic regulatory and governance changes. Mass protests and two failed land 
use planning processes in coastal British Columbia, colloquially known as the “war in the 
woods” were followed by NGO-led boycott campaigns targeting major wood purchasers. 
This affected markets, not only in B.C., but throughout the rest of Canada and the United 
States. Forestry companies with a legal licence to log faced severe difficulty accessing 
markets. Some eventually agreed to adopt the logging and forest management requirements 
of NGO-backed third-party certification schemes. This, together with the setting aside of 
increased levels of protected areas, ended boycott campaigns and re-opened markets for 
certified wood. Thus, regulatory approval and legal licence to conduct forestry activities 
were significantly supplanted by separate non-state and market-driven legitimacy-granting 
processes [43]. The terminology of “social licence” had not yet appeared in popular, 
industry or academic circles, but the forest certification scenario created much of the same 
tensions and rhetoric employed today in the social licence discussion in the energy sector. 
Industry felt it unfair and unnecessary to go beyond regulatory requirements, government 
struggled to find efficient regulation amid increasing public protest, and significant 
segments of civil society criticized the legitimacy of conventionally practised resource 
extraction.
While the supply chain dynamics around oil, natural gas and electricity production are 
not the same as forest products, the process of how forest certification gained legitimacy 
in this scenario may be instructive. Cashore [42] has adopted Suchman’s [256] concepts 
around organizational legitimacy to assess the process. He drew attention to three types of 
legitimacy that exist for a firm (and industry): pragmatic legitimacy; value-oriented moral 
legitimacy; and culturally based cognitive legitimacy. Cashore argues that the practical 
legitimacy of certification was easily attained because of the opportunity certification 
provided to re-open markets. He further argues that moral and cultural legitimacy 
remain in question and rest upon multiple factors, including fissures between previously 
supportive environmental groups and the rise of multiple competing certification schemes. 
However, in the years since Cashore’s analysis, it appears certification is here to stay. The 
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encouragement of forestry certification by provincial governments throughout Canada has 
contributed greatly to certification’s cultural and moral legitimacy. One lesson to take from 
the forestry experience is that government’s monopoly authority to regulate the energy 
sector is fragile, particularly if market access is threatened by negative evaluations of 
energy sector activities by NGOs or civil society.
4. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE  
 REGULATORY PROCESS
The goal of this section is to explore the influence of the concepts of social licence and 
public acceptance on energy project development and the regulatory process. A concept 
that originated in the mining sector, described in section 3.1.1 — social licence to operate 
— is used more and more often in the context of energy projects in Canada, but little 
is understood about how it applies (or whether it should apply) to these projects or their 
regulators. We explore the effects of apparent increased interest and opposition to energy 
projects by providing different arguments on the state of Canada’s regulatory process.
4.1. Case: The Regulatory Process is Broken
With the rise of the use of the term “social licence” across Canada, a significant question 
needs to be asked: Is the regulatory process broken? There are federal, provincial and 
territorial regulatory processes that must be considered within this question. What does it 
take to break a regulatory process? Is it a legitimate regulatory process if there is no public 
confidence? Is it broken when there is great public outcry, and how much public outcry 
is required to say it is broken? Is it only broken when courts rule the laws are invalid or 
reverse a project decision? Is the regulatory process broken when it does not comply with 
the legal duty to consult and accommodate First Nations or seek their consent when that is 
required? When does the regulatory process lack democratic legitimacy? And, finally, who 
decides if the regulatory process is broken? A closer look at all these questions will explore 
this issue. 
Recently, several energy projects that have been approved by the federal regulatory process 
are facing court challenges opposing this approval. Prominent examples include the Site C 
dam69 in northeastern British Columbia, jointly assessed by the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency and the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office, and Enbridge’s 
Northern Gateway pipeline,70 reviewed by the National Energy Board. The fact that major 
projects such as these, which have been approved via the regulatory process, are facing 
69 There were numerous challenges initiated, some of which have been subsequently dropped. See: [231] M. Preprost, “Two 
First Nations Withdraw from Fight Against Site C Dam,” Business in Vancouver, July 20, 2015 
70 In 2014, Northern Gateway had 18 court challenges brought against the NEB’s decision (or how it handled the process 
leading to the decision), filed by nine groups. In addition, the Gitxaala Nation challenged the Northern Gateway decision 
three times, challenging the Joint Review Panel’s decision, the Governor-in-Council’s decision, and the Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the board. These are clearly three separate court challenges, as they have 
three separate filing dates. However, if the question is “how many groups challenged this project” versus “how many court 
challenges were there,” the answer is different, as some of the challenges have been consolidated. For more details, see [199] 
National Energy Board. 2015. “Court Challenges To National Energy Board or Governor in Council Decisions.”
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such opposition suggests that the current regulatory process is not adequately accounting 
for social licence and is indeed broken. In addition, Kinder Morgan’s proposed expansion 
of the Trans Mountain pipeline has been challenged during the regulatory process, as has 
TransCanada’s proposed Energy East pipeline.
Through changes to the NEB Act introduced in Bill C-3871 in June 2012, the previous 
federal government had been trying to streamline regulatory reviews and environmental 
processes. The changes to the legislation adjusted the definition of who can present at 
hearings held by the NEB, and set out firm timelines for the regulatory process that 
necessarily limit the number of people who can present. These changes include bounding 
the time allowed for hearings in the approval process of a pipeline proposal to 18 months, 
and significantly reducing the number of individuals who are able to testify at such 
hearings. The new criteria for being able to testify at an NEB hearing was: people who 
stand to be directly impacted by a proposed project, and people who have information 
and expertise that could help the hearing panel gain a greater understanding of a given 
matter under consideration.72 It is the Board itself that decides whether a person, company, 
organization or group has standing based on various criteria.
A comparison of the hearing processes for both the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline 
and the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline show the effect that these changes have 
had. During the Northern Gateway project’s Joint Review Panel process there were 77 
days of community hearings in 21 communities. There were also 96 days of final hearings 
that took 10 months. The time invested in conducting these hearings was significant, but 
arguably allowed for a wider range of viewpoints to be heard. With the Kinder Morgan 
Trans Mountain pipeline, 2,118 people applied to participate; of the 852 who requested 
intervenor73 status, 400 received it and the rest were given commenter74 status; 798 
requested commenter status, which was granted, and 468 were denied the ability to 
participate.75 A citizens’ group is challenging this part of the NEB Act because it believes 
the definition for who is allowed to participate in the hearing process is now too narrow.76
This becomes a very pertinent issue in the question of regulatory legitimacy. The NEB’s 
determination of who gets to present has the consequence of stratifying and prioritizing 
stakeholders into those who are directly affected, those who object on moral grounds and 
those who are indirectly affected. Who should have a voice is a key and critical issue and it 
will be interesting to see what the results of this court challenge will be. 
Participants in the NEB hearings for the Trans Mountain pipeline were also denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine Kinder Morgan, the project proponent. It was felt this was 
71 [120] Bill C-38, Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act. 
72 S. 55.2 National Energy Board Act.
73 Acting as an intervenor means the person participating “may have the opportunity to present written evidence, question 
others on their written evidence, cross-examine other witnesses at the oral portion of the hearing, and give final argument,” 
as well as be questioned on evidence they present. See: [198] NEB, National Energy Board Hearing Process Handbook. 
74 Acting as a commenter means the participant submits a letter of comment, but cannot ask questions of other participants’ 
evidence or submit a final argument. See ibid.
75 See [197] National Energy Board, “Ruling on Participation,” Hearing Order OH-001-2014, 2 April 2014. 
76 See [52] M. Chisholm, “Citizens Unleash Constitutional Challenge Against Kinder Morgan NEB Pipeline Review,” 
Vancouver Observer, May 6, 2014.
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a breach of the rules of natural justice and left many feeling like there were questions that 
remained unanswered. Robyn Allan, an intervenor in the proceeding, said that “cross-
examination gives NEB hearing participants the ability to spot inaccuracies, clarify 
contradictions, and assist the panel in making a competent decision in the public interest.”77 
In a submission to the hearing, Allan argues, “If the public believes, or has reason to 
believe, the NEB review process is biased in favour of the industry and unfair to the public 
interest because intervenors in this hearing are not able to fulfil their role, the public may 
no longer support the hearing process, or the National Energy Board as an institution.”78 
The lack of cross-examination has never occurred before in a pipeline application of this 
kind. Instead, the NEB is using written information requests to test the evidence. In the 
Northern Gateway hearings, 90 days were used for cross-examination. No days were set 
aside for Kinder Morgan.
In an open letter to the NEB, Marc Eliesen, former CEO of BC Hydro, and former chair 
of Manitoba Hydro, with 40 years of experience in the energy sector, withdrew from 
participation in the process, calling it a sham and not in the public interest.79 In his letter, 
he condemns the lack of cross-examination and the inadequate response to information 
requests. There were over 2,000 questions asked of Kinder Morgan, only five per cent of 
which the Board required an answer from the company. Also, the Board denied requests 
for extensions to submit information requests by project opponents. Due to his concerns, 
Eliesen encouraged the province of British Columbia to withdraw from the NEB process 
and hold its own separate review panel. This reaction from a member of the energy industry 
is indicative of a process that is broken, or at least in jeopardy, and which is quickly losing 
credibility with the public.
Furthermore, requests from the cities of Vancouver and Burnaby for more information 
regarding emergency response plans for an oil spill were denied, compounding the doubts 
that this was a fair and open process. Vancouver Mayor Gregor Robertson told the CEO 
of Kinder Morgan that there is “a lack of public confidence in the NEB” and Mayor 
Derek Corrigan of Burnaby called the process “a sham.”80 The government of B.C. added 
controversy to proposed pipeline projects by amending the Parks Act to allow pipelines to 
go through provincial parks.81 The area on Burnaby Mountain is a city-owned conservation 
site that many value, and part of the route for the proposed pipeline expansion.
The City of Burnaby went to court to try to stop Kinder Morgan from doing survey work 
on Burnaby Mountain, but the injunction was denied. Because of that denial, protests led to 
over 100 arrests.82 When the court found out Kinder Morgan used wrong GIS co-ordinates 
for the injunction, all the charges were thrown out.83 All of these events have cast doubt on 
77 See [204] A. Nikiforuk, “No Cross-Exam in Trans Mountain Hearing Hurts NEB Credibility: Economist,” The Tyee, April 
23, 2014.
78 [5] R. Allan, “Notice of Motion,” April 14, 2014.
79 [85] M. Eliesen, “Letter of Withdrawal,” Oct. 30, 2014. 
80 See [50] CBC News, “NEB CEO Peter Watson Heckled by Kinder Morgan Pipeline Protesters,” April 24, 2015.
81 The bill was passed March 24, 2014. See [171] Legislative Assembly of British Columbia. 2014. “Bill 4 – 2014: Park 
Amendment Act, 2014.” 
82 See [232] M. Prystupa and J. Uechi, “RCMP Responds with Respect as Grand Chief Arrested on Burnaby Mountain,” 
Vancouver Observer, Nov. 27, 2014.
83 See [159] J. Keller, “Burnaby Mountain Protest Charges Dropped,” Huffington Post, Nov. 27, 2014.
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the regulatory process. City mayors making claims that there is no public confidence in the 
NEB, and that its process is a sham, followed by significant protests leading to arrests, are 
indicative of a regulatory process that is broken. 
In 2012, omnibus bills C-38 (the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act) and C-45 
(the Jobs and Growth Act), were both passed with no public consultation, and limited 
debate in Parliament. These omnibus bills changed several acts. They repealed the 
Environmental Assessment Act and replaced it with the Environmental Assessment Act 
2012; changes in the new act limit the definition of environmental effects to fisheries, 
marine animals in the Species at Risk Act, and migratory birds. The Fisheries Act now 
only protects habitat for Aboriginal recreation and commercial fisheries, but overall habitat 
protection is weakened. The Navigable Waters Protection Act exempts pipelines and power 
lines from its application. The NEB absorbs the Navigable Waters Protection Act when 
there is a pipeline or power line. The National Energy Board Act was changed to limit 
applications to an 18-month time frame. The fact that so many legislative changes could 
take place in two parliamentary bills, with little debate and no outside consultation, gives 
the impression that the government of Canada does not value consulting on processes, laws 
and policies.
The Mikisew Cree and Frog Lake First Nations challenged these omnibus bills, claiming 
that these changes that they introduced significantly affected protections for their traditional 
lands, which triggers a duty to consult with the affected First Nations. The Federal Court of 
Canada ruled in favour of the Mikisew Cree and Frog Lake First Nations, saying the federal 
government had a duty to consult with them.84 However, the court did not overrule the laws 
that were passed. It was an empty victory. Such cases leave the impression that while First 
Nations use the legal system to resolve situations peacefully, it does not bring the kind of 
remedies they need and want and they have to look at other avenues.
The B.C. government provided tax concessions (relative to previous announcements on the 
level of taxation) to liquefied natural gas (LNG) project proponents through Bill 26.85 The 
federal government in turn provided a tax break for LNG projects. The implication is that 
both levels of government are trying to incent LNG companies to make the final investment 
decision. The public can see that governments are pushing for large energy projects. This 
also contributes to the public thinking the regulatory process is broken, and the impression 
that governments will provide consent to projects no matter what. 
4.1.1. Crisis of Legitimacy?
Is social licence reflective of a crisis of legitimacy in this country? It would seem to be 
so. Former Natural Resources minister Joe Oliver publicly stated that social licence was 
being used by a minority of opponents to block a project even after it had been approved 
and determined to be in the national interest.86 Oliver also publicly called opponents of 
84 [188] Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), 2014 FC 1244.
85 [116] Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Finance. March 25, 2015. “Commitment to Finalize LNG Income Tax 
Framework Fulfilled.”
86 [95] J. Fekete, “‘Minority’ using ‘Social Licence’ to Block Resource Projects, Joe Oliver says,” Ottawa Citizen, March 6, 
2015. 
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Canada’s energy markets “radicals” with a radical ideological agenda that undermined 
the national economic interest.87 This called into question the government’s ability and 
willingness to legitimize varying viewpoints on energy development. B.C. Premier Christy 
Clark and former Alberta premier Jim Prentice have said that social licence is needed for 
major projects like Northern Gateway.88 Such statements show that social licence is gaining 
momentum and credibility. The recognition by ministers and premiers that social licence is 
a going concern illustrates the crisis of legitimacy.
Raven Coal is a proposed project in Comox, B.C. that has been withdrawn in the face of 
public opposition. On its second attempt to get its application for a coal mine through the 
B.C. Environmental Assessment, it withdrew its application, citing misinformation in the 
involved communities.89 Opponents to the project commented that there was no social 
licence for Raven Coal.90 Opposition was quite strong to this project, both in Comox, the 
mine site, and Port Alberni, B.C., the port from which the coal would be shipped. Raven 
Coal spent $20 million as of March 2015 trying to get its application through and has 
walked away due to public opposition based on what it considers “misinformation.”91 
In British Columbia, several proposed energy projects are in court due to challenges of 
the regulatory process or the consultation process with First Nations. For example, the 
proposed Site C dam, as of April 2015, had seven court cases against it.92 The Peace Valley 
Landowners Association challenged the validity of the environmental assessment process 
and lost in the B.C. Supreme Court.93 As well, the Treaty 8 First Nations challenged 
the validity of the environmental assessment process for the project and lack of proper 
consultation.94 The B.C. Supreme Court dismissed the judicial review of the environmental 
assessment certificate,95 and the project appears to be going ahead and is under 
construction.
As mentioned previously, Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project also has multiple court 
challenges against it and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain pipeline has been challenged 
before the final project decision has been reached.96 The amount of opposition that these 
projects are facing strongly suggests that they lack a social licence to proceed. Some of 
87 [140] L. Herrmann, “Canadian Resources Minister Calls Enviros ‘Radical Groups’,” Digital Journal, Jan. 11, 2012.
88 Ibid [95]. 
89 [54] Compliance Coal Corporation, Letter to B.C. Associate Deputy Minister of Environment, March 2, 2015.
90 
[252] S. Stanfield, “Raven Coal Mine Application Withdrawn,” Comox Valley Record, March 4, 2015. 
91 Ibid.
92 
[274] J. Wakefield, “Site C Faces First Volley in Barrage of Legal Challenges,” Alaska Highway News, April 20, 2015.
93 [40] Canadian News Wire, “PVLA Appeals B.C. Supreme Court Ruling on Site C and Strongly Endorses B.C. Auditor 
General Performance Audit of Site C,” July 22, 2015.
94 [158] J. Keller, “First Nations Launch Federal Court Challenge of B.C.’s Site C Dam,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 14, 2014. 
95 [253] W. Stodalka, “Judge Closes One Door, Opens Another on Site C Legal Challenge,” Victoria Times Colonist, Sept. 20, 
2015. 
96 See [199] National Energy Board, “Court Challenges…”
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these groups, such as Tsleil Waututh and Treaty 8, who are bringing court cases, are 
canvassing for donations to offset legal fees, and those who are opposing these projects are 
contributing to these funds in the hopes the projects will be stopped.97
In New Brunswick, clashes over hydraulic fracturing have been prevalent and the question 
of what social licence actually means has been raised in the legislature.98 Marches, protests 
and petitions have come from New Brunswickers as the pressure not to allow hydraulic 
fracturing was mounted by communities and environmental groups.99 The premier of 
New Brunswick and his government announced on Dec. 18, 2014 that they were placing 
a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing until five conditions were met: a social licence, a 
process to consult with First Nations, a plan for mitigating impacts on public infrastructure, 
a mechanism in place to maximize benefits for New Brunswick, and credible information 
about the impacts of fracking on health, water and the environment.100 
In Newfoundland and Labrador, the opposition to hydraulic fracturing led the minister of 
Natural Resources to appoint an independent panel to look into its socio-economic and 
environmental effects.101 Finally, in the Northwest Territories, the government engaged in 
consultation on proposed regulation on hydraulic fracturing. Consultations ended in June 
2015, and the government is expected to pass the regulations.102 Public consultation showed 
opposition to hydraulic fracturing from the public and First Nations,103 and the government 
of the Northwest Territories has subsequently committed to further discussion of the 
regulations.104
The issue of a crisis of legitimacy can be found in how the Crown treats First Nations’ 
constitutionally protected rights and how the Crown carries out the duty to consult. A 
regulatory process cannot be considered legitimate if it overrides First Nations’ rights 
and title. The courts have said that consultation can go through the regulatory process as 
long as “available regulatory processes are accessible, adequate and provide First Nations 
an opportunity to participate in a meaningful way.”105 In the Taku River Tlingit case,106 
the courts decided that because the Taku had participated fully in the environmental 
assessment process, their views had been put forward and their concerns were addressed by 
the measures put in place in the medium and long terms. Because of this participation in the 
97 See [236] Respecting Aboriginal Values and Environmental Needs, “Join the Circle – No Site C” and [243] Sacred Trust 
Initiative, “About Sacred Trust.”
98 [229] J. Poitras, “‘Social Licence’ Clouds Debates over Fracking, Pipelines,” CBC News, Dec. 22, 2014. 
99 See [176] E. Lui, “A Trip to New Brunswick to Learn About Shale Gas Development and What Communities are Doing 
About it,” Rabble, April 11, 2014, and [250] T. J. Skolnick, “Digging Deeper into New Brunswick’s Fracking Controversy,” 
The Tyee, Aug. 10, 2011. 
100 
[125] Government of New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Government Introduces Moratorium on Hydraulic Fracturing 
in New Brunswick,” press release, Dec. 18, 2014.
101 [126] Newfoundland & Labrador Ministry of Natural Resources, “Minister Announces Independent Panel for Review of 
Hydraulic Fracturing,” press release, Oct. 10, 2014.
102 [273] A. Vivian, “Fracking in the NWT,” The Lawyers Weekly, June 19, 2015. 
103 [99] Fort Nelson First Nation Lands Department, “Dene Nation Speaks out on Proposed Controversial Regulations for 
Fracking: Multiple Presenters Stand in Line Late into Evening to Voice Concerns,” June 17, 2015.
104 [127] Government of the Northwest Territories, “Discussions on Hydraulic Fracturing Regulations to Continue into 18th 
Legislative Assembly,” Sept. 17, 2015. 
105 [32] Brokenhead Ojibway Nation et al., v. A.G. (Can.), 2009 FC 484, para. 42.
106 [258] Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74.
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environmental review process, it was ruled that they did not need a consultation process in 
addition to the environmental assessment. The Tsleil-Waututh, in their federal appeal of the 
Trans Mountain pipeline, argued that their ability to appear for a short time before the NEB 
panel was not sufficient for consultation and accommodation.107 The eight First Nations who 
challenged the Northern Gateway project and the five First Nations who challenged the Site 
C dam are all examples of how affected First Nations respond to the crisis of legitimacy. 
The increasing number of protests in various areas of Canada is also culminating in a crisis 
of legitimacy. When premiers and mayors demand that social licence be required before a 
project commences, it strongly suggests that the regulatory process’s legitimacy is at stake. 
4.1.2.  Democratic Elections are Insufficient Checks for the Regulatory 
Process 
Can the public rely on electing representatives to Parliament or their legislatures to provide 
for sufficient checks in the regulatory process? This is a question that should be more 
fully explored beyond this white paper; we do know that the election process happens 
approximately every four years and it is too slow or infrequent to be an immediate check 
on the regulatory process. While election platforms may provide some information on the 
party’s proposed direction on energy and the environment, voters do not know the detailed 
agenda that the party will actually undertake on the environment, GHG reductions, climate 
change, and their opinions on specific energy projects. For instance, the Conservative Party 
of Canada condemned the use of omnibus bills by the Liberals during their 2006 election 
campaign, and since used them to do wholescale changes to multiple acts at a time. 
While a particular MP or MLA may have the environment’s best interests at heart, the 
majority of the time party policy will dictate how they vote. When people in B.C. voted in 
the Liberal party, they did not know that the government’s subsequent actions would allow 
pipelines through parks (via Bill 4, Park Amendment Act) or remove the B.C. Utilities 
Commission’s oversight on major projects like Site C, Northwest Transmission Line and 
upgrades to the Mica and Revelstoke dams (via Bill 17, Clean Energy Act).
In addition, as circumstances change in the provinces or federally, the party in power may 
change its election promises or deal with an issue in a way that could never have been 
predicted. In very rare circumstances, people are elected or not elected based on their 
positions on such energy or environment issues as hydraulic fracturing.108 
4.1.3.  The Current Regulatory Process has not Adapted to Accommodate 
Changes in Societal and Technological Realities
Today’s societies are very concerned about the cumulative effects of overall development, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and in particular, climate change. As the world experiences 
global warming, shrinking ice packs, warming waters and severe weather events, climate 
change is becoming more important to Canadians. One major issue with the current federal 
107 See [199] National Energy Board, “Court Challenges …” 
108 [175] N. Logan, “N.B. Election: Did Shale Gas and Fracking Sway the Vote?”, Global News, Sept. 23, 2014. 
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regulatory process is that there is no opportunity for review of the impacts of developments 
on climate change, or of cumulative effects, both of which are critical for preparing for 
more developments in the future.109 Another key issue is that the current national energy 
strategy is insufficient to address these problems. 
Technology has made it easier to oppose projects in a greater way and has added to the 
power of social licence. Social media gets the message out immediately, information is 
easier to access than it has ever been, and more people can be reached in a quicker time 
period. On the day that the Northern Gateway project was approved, a message went 
out to flood the streets with people to show continued opposition to it.110 Blogs, websites, 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr and many other methods provide people with 
information on projects as well.
The questions that began this section require more analysis as to what criteria should be 
used in determining if a regulatory process is broken. The indicators that were explored 
show that they could be used to show that the regulatory system is broken or, at the very 
least, is in jeopardy and close to being broken. This will change with various parties 
involved. The provincial or federal government will be the last to figure out that the process 
is broken and needs to be changed to meet the general public’s values. First Nations, and 
environmental and other groups may believe the processes are broken and are the ones 
challenging the process in court or on the ground. 
4.2. Case: The Regulatory Process is Not Broken
The research discussed in section 3 provides various analyses of what the term “social 
licence” means. Although there are different perspectives, there seems to be consensus that 
legitimacy and trust in the decision-making process, including the regulatory process, are 
key to social acceptance of major projects. 
The question remains, however, who decides? Who must accept a project before it can 
proceed? How many members of the public must say so? If a majority of the public trusts 
the regulatory process, believing it to be legitimate, is that sufficient? Is it still sufficient if a 
vocal minority says otherwise? From where do the members of a vocal minority derive their 
legitimacy? How do decision-makers react — and how should they react — in the face of 
public protest, even if the then-current regulatory process is followed?
Much of the discussion assumes that because of protests, media coverage and other 
negative commentary, certain major projects have not achieved the necessary social licence 
or social acceptance. Northern Gateway, the proposed pipeline project from Alberta to 
the Pacific Coast, is an example. It received approval by the Joint Review Panel of the 
National Energy Board/Ministry of the Environment, but after over four years of study 
and hearings, the approval was conditional on the project meeting 209 specific conditions. 
This was no rubber stamp. However, notwithstanding such approval and the stringency of 
109 The issue of cumulative effects is also related to the issue of jurisdiction. In the case of federal regulatory processes, 
concern over upstream developments is difficult to appropriately address as these are regulated at the provincial level.
110 [10] I. Bailey, “‘The war is on’: Protesters Set Sights on Harper After Northern Gateway Decision,” Globe and Mail, June 
18, 2014.
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the conditions, certain national politicians have said they would prevent the project from 
being built, citing lack of social licence. The regulatory process for TransCanada’s Energy 
East project, a proposed pipeline to carry oil to the East Coast, has only just begun, but 
again, some politicians are already saying no. Before even giving the established regulatory 
process a chance, they are already claiming that the project does not have the necessary 
social licence.111
Section 3 of this paper attempts to define the concept of social licence or social acceptance, 
who grants it, with what legitimacy, and whether it exists with respect to any particular 
project or process. The bigger question, then, is what do those conclusions (or the lack 
thereof) mean for decision-makers with respect to such projects or processes?
Do public protests, leading to delays or cancellations of projects notwithstanding 
compliance with the regulatory process, mean that the regulatory process is broken? In this 
section of the report, we suggest that the system is not broken — capable of improvement, 
yes — but not broken. On the contrary, we argue that the system that we have would 
be broken if, in reaction to special interests or what could be a vocal minority, political 
decision-makers usurp, override or ignore decisions made by our established regulatory 
process, in the absence of clear evidence of public opinion by way of an election or a 
referendum. 
4.2.1. The Regulatory Process
Our regulatory system is not a singular or static thing. It encompasses the variety of 
regulatory processes that Canada (at the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal levels) 
has implemented and refined, over many years. These must be undertaken and complied 
with before virtually any type of project can proceed. These laws and regulatory processes 
have been developed in order to promote and protect the local, regional or national (as 
applicable) public interest, from economic, environmental and security perspectives – often 
changed by legislators in response to public input.
In Canada, anyone proposing to build virtually anything — a road, a railway, a housing 
development, a pipeline, a well for water, a mine, an airport, a subway station, a factory, 
a hospital, a dairy farm — must obtain regulatory approval to proceed. Such approval 
requires compliance with environmental assessment legislation (federal and/or provincial 
and/or municipal), and a host of other rules and regulations that may include zoning bylaws, 
noise regulations, and other requirements specific to the proposed activity and location. 
Some decisions that are needed for the benefit of the larger good may still have certain 
negative consequences. Our regulatory tribunals need to take into consideration 
environmental effects, Aboriginal rights, and local and community preferences, but they 
must balance those with what is in the larger public interest. They make recommendations 
based on a review of scientific and technical information placed on the record by both 
proponents and objectors; they make recommendations based on the evidence provided, 
within the legal framework enacted by Parliament and applied by the courts. 
111 See: [209] D. O’Keefe, “Energy East Lacks Social Licence: Trudeau,” Ricochet, Dec. 15, 2014, and [210] P. O’Neil, “Tom 
Mulcair Fights the Squeeze in Metro Vancouver Ridings,” The Vancouver Sun, March 17, 2015. 
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Most applications, for all sorts of projects, proceed uneventfully. The regulatory process 
results in recommendations to proceed, to not proceed, or to proceed provided a number 
of conditions are met, and appeal processes are provided and complied with. By far, the 
majority of these decisions are made with no, or very little, public protest, and projects are 
either denied or built based on the scientific and other evidence gathered for the purpose. 
This includes evidence presented via public hearings, all of which is then analyzed by the 
regulatory bodies involved.112 
Our overall regulatory system is not broken; indeed, it functions well most of the time. 
4.2.2. The Challenges
There are, however, some exceptions. They may be small in number, but large in terms of 
project size, level of public protest and/or media attention. The challenges faced by these 
projects have prompted this discussion. 
But where exactly does the problem lie? 
(i) Is it when a regulatory body reaches a decision or makes a recommendation, 
having fulfilled its legislative mandate and complied with the rules set out for the 
process (a decision), there is some public protest, but the proponents and political 
decision-makers still proceed according to the decision? 
(ii) Is it when a regulatory body reaches a decision, there is some public protest, and 
because of the protest the proponents choose not to proceed with the project? This 
may suit the protesters’ wishes, but if any of these projects would have been in 
the larger public interest, has the process that resulted in a decision not to proceed 
somehow failed the public it is supposed to serve?
(iii) Is it where a regulatory body reaches a decision, there is some public protest, and 
although the proponents are willing to proceed, political decision-makers refuse 
to implement the decision or otherwise publicly deny its legitimacy? As above, 
this may suit the wishes of those who disagree with the project, but the political 
decision-makers have an obligation to make decisions in the larger public interest, 
and for the larger public good. In this case, one could argue that the system has 
failed, if the cancelled project would indeed have been in the larger public interest, 
then the public interest is the loser.
In every case, the fundamental question must be, which should be given precedence, (i) 
the results of a comprehensive, legislatively mandated and rules-driven regulatory process, 
established and evolved through our democratic processes to serve the public interest 
(and for large infrastructure projects, the larger, national public good); or (ii) protests, by 
relatively undefined, unidentified113 and unelected people and groups?
112 For example, the original Keystone pipeline had 30 intervenors and six commenters, and the Enbridge Line 9 Reversal 
Phase I hearing had 18 intervenors and 145 commenters.
113 This piece assumes that Aboriginal groups are in a position to pursue treaty and other rights, as they already exist and are 
being increasingly well-defined and quantified, and that those legal rights do not form part of the more nebulous “social 
licence.” 
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The answer, in a democratic society such as ours, must be the process. Yes, it can and 
should be improved — it has been, and will continue to be, very much as a result of public 
input — but it must be what we rely on until such improvements are made. Otherwise, 
political decision-makers’ power is no longer constrained by our rule of law, something that 
is fundamental to a democracy.
4.2.3 Trust and Legitimacy
The whole system is based on the fundamental social contract between the public and 
government, well-described in section 3 of this paper as the recognition that society is built 
upon an unwritten acceptance by the public to be subject to a set of rules. Fundamental to 
this social contract, however, is the public’s trust in government, which can only exist if the 
public believes in the relevant government’s legitimacy. 
Do the public protests, media coverage and negative commentary with respect to certain 
projects and certain aspects of the regulatory process suggest that the public has lost that 
required level of trust and that belief in the system’s legitimacy? The critical piece here 
is that we don’t know. The only way, in our democratic system, to know this for sure is 
by way of an election or a referendum. Absent that, the level of dissent is impossible to 
measure. Terms such as “public opinion,” “environmental groups,” “opinion leaders,” 
“stakeholders,” “civil society” and “community” are repeatedly used, but how are they 
defined? How are they measured? How is support measured versus opposition? Polls are 
conducted from time to time, but they are fraught with difficulty, including the purposes of 
the polls, the questions asked, and who is being polled. Small numbers of protesters may 
represent the majority of public opinion, but the opposite may be true — they may also 
represent only a small minority, with the silent majority supporting a particular project or 
process. We simply don’t know. That’s why we have developed the regulatory processes we 
have. 
4.2.4. The Evolution of the Regulatory System in Our Democratic Society
There are, and will almost always be, people who do not agree with certain decisions, or 
with the processes by which those decisions were arrived at. But policy-makers, law-makers 
and other decision-makers must remember that their responsibility is to the larger public 
interest, to the larger public good, not to those who may be most vocal or those who get 
the most media coverage. Certainly, protests, commentary and open discussion can, should 
and do inform those law-makers. Part of how the system works, and how it has evolved and 
improved over time, is that those law-makers respond to what they see as changes in public 
opinion by changing laws and amending regulatory processes. Sometimes, it can be slow, 
and it may not be perfect, but it is how our democracy works.
Indeed, over the course of Canadian history, thanks to democratically elected officials 
at all levels of government, legislation and regulatory processes have evolved, keeping 
pace (more or less) with evolving public perceptions. They have become increasingly 
comprehensive, more attuned to environmental, labour and other socio-economic concerns. 
They continue to evolve in this way, as the notion of what comprises the public interest also 
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evolves, and as elected politicians react to those changes in opinion through the process of 
changing legislation. Although the details of a particular regulatory approach can always be 
improved, in general, this evolving process is how the required level of trust and sense of 
legitimacy is maintained. 
4.2.5.  The Importance, in a Democracy, of Adhering to the Regulatory 
Process
We argue here that, rather than increasing a sense of trust and legitimacy, usurping this 
process in reaction to protests — or in reaction solely to any special interest group(s), 
whether business, provincial governments, municipal representatives, environmental 
NGOs, or any other interested stakeholder(s) —does the opposite. Allowing political 
decision-makers to usurp the end result of the process, in effect allows them what amounts 
to veto power over those we have entrusted with a process that is in the larger public 
interest. This approach is more than just problematic, it borders on anarchy.
There is no question that legitimate environmental and other concerns need to be heard 
— and addressed — before large infrastructure projects are able to proceed. And despite 
some progress, settling Aboriginal land claims and establishing mutual understanding and 
agreement for the future must happen; yet, it is taking far too long. 
Fortunately in Canada, people have the right to protest peacefully, without fear of being 
harmed. They have the right to lobby for changes in policy. They have the right to work 
for a change in government to one that they believe better respects their concerns, such as 
environmental sustainability and Aboriginal rights. But do they have the right to ignore or 
usurp decisions that have been arrived at through our democratically elected and developed 
process? 
No.
We elect our politicians, and although the results never please everyone, it is a pretty good 
system. The politicians we elect pass laws — again, not to everyone’s satisfaction, but that 
is the job with which our system entrusts them. Those laws create the rules and regulations 
that in turn establish, (often over the course of multiple governments and different political 
parties) our regulatory bodies and processes that we rely on to analyze, review, deny or 
approve things like big infrastructure projects.
Those politicians and other decision-makers who now use the term “social licence” to 
question those decisions may have good intentions. They may just be angling for votes. 
Either way, however, they are undermining — indeed, subverting — the processes that 
have evolved over many years in the very system that gave them their jobs. They should 
be encouraged to revise the processes as they deem necessary, but they must not be able to 
ignore them in the meantime.
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4.2.6. Practical Reality – The System can be Improved
The practical reality, however, is that we now face what appears to be growing public 
protest (or what seems to be more vocal and more widespread through social media) over 
certain projects and certain regulatory decisions. Some commentators, including some 
heavily involved in the regulatory process itself acknowledge that not all of our regulatory 
processes are the same, nor equally effective.114 Some have better outcomes than others, 
both (i) in the decisions being made in the best interest of the public versus special-interest 
stakeholders, and (ii) in the acceptance of the decisions by those who feel that the process 
was not sufficiently transparent or that they were excluded from meaningful participation. 
“Strategic regulatory processes can be designed to produce good outcomes. However, they 
can also result in a free-for-all where the public interest gets sacrificed for the interests of 
the politically influential.”115 Lack of transparency is particularly problematic. And when 
parties feel excluded from the official process, they can and do resort to public protest, 
negative social media messaging, and even civil disobedience. Proponents will hesitate to 
proceed and politicians will sway toward what they perceive is vote-worthy rather than 
evidentiary, and projects that might otherwise be in the public interest are significantly 
delayed or stopped altogether. 
The answer is not to replace undue influence of some interests with undue influence of 
others. “In the long run, it is in no one’s interest, even the currently politically influential, 
to have weak processes for formulating decisions. We need to enlist all stakeholders, 
including business and civil society, to build broad support for regulatory processes that 
have integrity…” [26].116 
Should we insist that the regulatory process we have be followed, even if not perfect? As 
a democracy, yes. But can the regulatory process be improved in a way that legitimate 
concerns are more thoroughly addressed, and the process improved in ways that will 
increase the level of trust in the results, thus reducing public protest? 
Yes, as well. 
4.3. Case: The Regulatory Process Is Not Broken, but Should Be Improved
The regulatory process is complex and working to accommodate social acceptance is a 
challenging process. As noted earlier in this paper, the regulatory process must address 
three key dimensions that include the efficiency and competitiveness of markets, energy 
security and environmental impacts. Striking the appropriate balance among these factors 
is critical. Further complicating goals aimed at reforming the regulatory process is the mix 
of regulatory processes provincially and federally and the balance of control over energy 
resources and trade in energy resources between the provinces and federal government. 
114 Paul Boothe, former deputy minister, Environment Canada, has some insightful thoughts on what constitutes good 
regulation in [26] P. Boothe, “Making Good Regulations,” Canadian Public Policy, 39(3), 2013, 359-370.
115 Ibid, 361.
116 Note: Boothe’s paper includes a description, from his experience at Environment Canada, of what he refers to as the 
five characteristics of world-class regulation: (i) evidence-based decision-making; (ii) effectiveness; (iii) efficiency; (iv) 
transparency; (v) adaptability. 
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Social licence is a contested concept and, earlier in the paper, various versions of this 
concept were discussed including the pyramid model, the three-strand model, and the 
triangle model. This section highlights how public acceptance can be better addressed in 
energy project development. 
4.3.1. Federal-Provincial Collaboration to Standardize Regulation 
Greater collaboration between federal and provincial regulatory bodies has been 
highlighted as necessary in creating confidence in the energy development sector. At the 
2013 Council of the Federation meeting, delegates discussed the need for more transparency 
and collaboration, noting the importance of seeking intergovernmental collaboration in 
efforts to optimize the strengths and opportunities for each province and territory with 
respect to energy development. Areas of potential collaboration included new technologies, 
energy conservation and energy resources. Underpinning the potential to realize the 
benefits of greater collaboration among federal, provincial and territorial jurisdictions was 
overall greater alignment of the regulatory process.
Greater alignment between the federal and provincial regulatory processes, including a 
shift toward “one project, one review” for major resource projects, is critical in advancing 
regulatory efforts.117 Regulatory reform of this nature would enhance project certainty, 
reduce risk and provide efficiency for the energy sector and government regulators. 
Movement in this direction would create a greater environment for business investment 
and improve the national economy [89]. Regulatory reform of this nature does not imply 
a relaxation of socio-economic and environmental goals and objectives for the energy 
industry but rather considers how energy development can proceed, and become less 
regulatorily burdensome, without provinces, territories and other stakeholders forfeiting 
environmental and socio-economic objectives. 
Further federal, provincial and territorial government collaborative efforts with respect to 
energy development include:118
• Implementing an early warning system to proactively flag significant issues that may 
arise during the review of a major resource project;
• Applying Aboriginal consultation mechanisms to improve federal-provincial co-
ordination of consultation processes and issue resolution;
• Developing harmonized federal-provincial project agreements to improve alignment 
of federal and provincial review processes;
• Mapping federal and provincial project review processes to demonstrate areas of 
alignment and to facilitate substitution and equivalency;
• Implementing alignment mechanisms through pilot projects.
Recommendations for reforms to the regulatory process fall under six key categories,  
and include eliminating uncertainty in the regulatory process, shortening project review 
117 [200] Natural Resources Canada, “Canada’s Annual Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference — Energy.”
118 [88] Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference, “Toward Greater Pan-Canadian Collaboration: A Progress Report,” 2012. 
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timelines, developing mechanisms for balancing risk, increasing transparency, limiting joint 
review panels, and clarifying Aboriginal consultation.119
At the 2013 Council of the Federation meeting, premiers of the provinces and territories 
discussed energy security and stability. A key issue discussed was the need for greater 
transparency in the regulatory process that would support more responsible energy 
development. A more vigorous environment management regime coupled with greater 
transparency would effectively ensure a secure energy supply to Canadians and allow for 
“non-discriminatory transportation and transmission of energy resources.”120
Additional mechanisms and processes to further support greater federal and provincial 
collaboration related to energy development can include a regional planning-based 
regulatory approach. This approach would involve multiple stakeholders and a cross-
sectoral approach to regulating energy development. A regional planning-based regulatory 
approach would also cut across different municipalities but have these municipalities co-
operating. Other suggestions for federal and provincial collaboration include:
• An energy forum to create greater collaboration and dialogue between federal 
and provincial leaders. This forum would be developed so as to avoid political 
grandstanding;
• A national energy strategy where projects are considered in the context of a national 
strategy and not as one-offs. This strategy could include common understanding as to 
how we are developing energy resources. 
Efforts toward greater federal-provincial regulatory collaboration are an ongoing concern 
and may reduce risk and uncertainty and build investor confidence. These efforts may also 
build stakeholder confidence, as central to many of these discussions is the importance of 
transparency and a more rigorous environmental review. 
4.3.2. Trust
Building trust in the regulatory process requires regulators and energy developers to be 
mindful of their motivations for consulting stakeholders. The following section highlights 
key issues in engaging stakeholders that regulators and developers should rethink with 
respect to energy development and regulatory reform.
Trust is a core issue that deeply influences the level of faith in the regulatory process 
with respect to energy development. Trust in government and regulatory processes have 
historically diminished due to past projects and the way in which they were approved 
[67]. Because of this history, many stakeholders (e.g., land owners, First Nations, etc.) 
are strongly influenced by, and have become more risk averse in regards to, development 
projects that might affect them. Acknowledging past mistakes and offering apologies are 
considered necessary to rebuilding trust. More important, however, is not repeating the 
same mistakes but changing how projects proceed in the future.
119 Ibid.
120 [58] Council of the Federation, “Canadian Energy Strategy: Progress Report to the Council of the Federation,” July 2013.
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Informing stakeholders of energy projects and involving them in discussions of their 
potential impacts at the earliest stages in project development is critical to building trust. 
Doing so may not always lead to project approval by stakeholders, and in many cases might 
only provide a level of community and stakeholder tolerance for a project [67, 286]. Lack of 
project approval may not always imply that the project has been rejected. 
Table 7 highlights the key themes in stakeholder engagement in the literature with respect 
to renewable energy projects. Lessons can be drawn from these examples across the energy 
development sector.
TABLE 7 KEY THEMES IN STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Theme Description Source
Acceptance Primary goal of consultation: achieve local acceptance. Can and will vary 
at different levels; e.g., society may believe in renewables but market may 
not support them. Broad socio-political support for alternative energy may 
coexist with local resistance to a given project.
[291] Wustenhagen et al. (2007)
[67] Delvaux et al. (2013)
Relationship Building/
Early Contact
Consultation should begin as early as possible in the planning stages. 
Fosters trust and communication. Allows local concerns and views to 
be taken into account early on. Allows for protocols to be established 
regarding what and when information should be shared.
[67] Delvaux et al. (2013)
Trust Absolutely necessary to successful project implementation. Naturally 
builds very slowly. Can be lost very quickly.
[79] Dorian et al. (2006)
[291] Wustenhagen et al. (2007)
[237] Ricci et al. (2010)
[1] Adams et al. (2011)
Environmental, Noise 
and Visual Impacts
Impacts on audio-visual land- or seascapes or environment can cause 
opposition. Result of place attachment. Renewables can be seen either 
to fit in the landscape or not. Fit influences perception as benefit or 
detriment.
[291] Wustenhagen et al. (2007)
 [259] Tarr (2012)
[286] Wiersma and Devine-Wright (2014)
Community Benefits 
or (Co-) Ownership
Direct benefits a key factor in achieving acceptance of a project. Local 
(co-)ownership, payments or lowered energy prices as possible methods 
to create these benefits. Many projects still developing novel models to 
attempt benefit-sharing.
[65] del Rio and Burgillo (2009)
[1] Adams et al. (2011)
[259] Tarr (2012)
[67] Delvaux et al (2013) [286] Wiersma and  
Devine-Wright (2014)
Equitable and Just 
Decision-Making
Major concerns exist over the fairness of decision-making regarding 
renewables siting. Exacerbated when developers not local. Participatory 
processes a method of achieving equity.
[65] del Rio and Burgillo (2009)
 [237] Ricci et al. (2010)
[1] Adams et al. (2011) 
[259] Tarr (2012)
[286] Wiersma and Devine-Wright (2014)
Information Sharing/
Capacity Building
Accessible and easily understood information vital. [237] Ricci et al. (2010)
[67] Delvaux et al. (2013)
Endogenous Devel-
opment
Reliance on local resources, workers and people. Incorporation of local 
beliefs and priorities in planning.
[65] del Rio and Burgillo (2009)
 [259] Tarr (2012)
[67] Delvaux et al. (2013)
4.3.2.1. Information Sharing and Capacity Building
Stakeholder capacity building is increasingly viewed as a key factor in public consultation 
processes. Capacity building can:
• Provide a common base of knowledge for stakeholder participation;
• Provide skills and knowledge to participate effectively;
• Combat misperceptions stakeholders may have about a project;
• Enhance local capacity to improve community beyond project.
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Capacity building by creating more awareness and increasing knowledge is essential, 
as it serves to develop ongoing and long-term relationships among stakeholders, project 
components and regulators [237]. Building capacity requires a real commitment from 
developers and regulators as engaging stakeholders in this manner often requires significant 
time (and often resources) in order to develop the necessary skills among stakeholders to 
participate in the regulatory process. Developing research skills is an essential aspect of 
this capacity building as it allows stakeholders to review and understand the many reports 
associated with most development projects. 
Supporting stakeholder capacity to participate in the regulatory process can involve other 
factors as well. Stakeholders who have early access to relevant data regarding energy 
development projects can contribute more effectively to discussions. In cases where 
stakeholders have budgetary limitations that could preclude their participation, funds should 
be made available to cover related travel costs. In the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) of the Bay of Fundy for Tidal Energy Development in Nova Scotia, funds were set 
aside by the Offshore Energy Research Association (OERA) to cover travel and research 
costs related to stakeholder participation in the SEA process.
In some cases, stakeholders may fail to understand aspects of the energy development 
project. In this case, it would be necessary to provide non-jargon translations and 
explanations about the technical aspects of the proposed project. Education training 
sessions open to the public or a group of select stakeholders may be one venue for providing 
this education and can also address other issues that might include education on the 
processes related to extracting energy from different environments. 
4.3.2.2. Relationship Building/Early Contact
Relationship building is key to building trust in the regulatory process. It should occur at 
the earliest stages of a project and be at the forefront of any strategy seeking to work toward 
a social licence [67]. Regulatory and energy development processes mindful of relationship 
building with relevant stakeholders are important aspects of developing a social licence. 
Local communities and relevant stakeholders may then perceive the regulatory process 
as a more collaborative approach, as opposed to an adversarial process. Furthermore, 
relationship building fosters other factors essential in working toward a social licence. 
For example, relationship building based on early disclosure of projects and education 
about the regulatory process and how energy is extracted, are ways in which trust can be 
built. Fostering trust through relationship building can be critical as projects move from 
the planning to implementation stages. Also, as new energy development initiatives arise, 
stakeholders are more likely to see their participation as meaningful if relationships have 
been developed. 
4.3.2.3. Summary
There is the perception that the regulatory process is broken. What makes the regulatory 
process more burdensome is that many stakeholders choose to use the regulatory process 
to engage in larger policy debates despite the fact that at times the issues raised fall outside 
regulatory purview. This phenomenon bogs down the regulatory process and gives the 
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perception that the process is broken. While the regulatory process may not be broken, 
there is indication that many stakeholders feel there is no space for the public to engage in 
debate on policy issues. Therefore, the regulatory process becomes in many respects the de 
facto venue for airing concerns on a broad range of related and unrelated topics with respect 
to a specific energy project. An example of this would be the issue of climate change. 
This issue has been imposed on local regulatory processes, as there is no other venue for 
discussion of these larger societal issues. 
While there is the perception that the regulatory process is broken, there are certainly 
challenges with respect to the political dimension in that often, federal or provincial 
politicians interfere in the regulatory process. Research should be conducted on metrics 
indicating where decisions were made through a regulatory process and how the political 
process and politicians then influenced these decisions. It should be noted that political 
processes beyond the regulatory process are common and that trying to isolate regulatory 
decisions from the political process might prove unrealistic.
If regulatory processes were reformed to enhance and support social licence, identifying 
aspects that build trust, legitimacy and credibility with the multiple stakeholders would 
be a critical component to address. In addition, regulatory reform should be approached 
that is mindful of creating space, if necessary, to engage in broader issues that relate to 
energy development, given few venues exist for stakeholders to voice these larger concerns. 
However, balancing these larger issues with the more immediate concerns related to an 
energy development approval process might prove difficult and unwieldy in the end and 
may bog down the regulatory process. Finally, removing the political process from the 
regulatory process may prove difficult, given our current political system. While developing 
research metrics that indicate to what extent political interference-altered regulatory 
decisions might help, it is unlikely that we can look forward to a regulatory process free of 
the political process.
4.3.3. Alternative Regulatory Approaches
Regulatory processes vary among federal and provincial jurisdictions. While streamlining 
regulatory processes based on similar projects might be one alternative, this can prove 
very difficult as well, given that no two projects are alike. While command-and-control 
characterizes traditional approaches to regulation, alternative approaches to energy 
regulation have been explored. Nymark and Edge explore regulatory reform through an 
extensive literature review and have identified 10 principles to support regulatory reform 
[208].
1. Regulatory reform programs must be broad in scope and a priority at the highest 
levels of government. 
2. Regulation should be results-oriented, effective, and respond quickly to new issues 
and emerging concerns. 
3. Regulation must be cost-efficient. 
4. Regulators should take into account potential risks and their possible impacts.
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5. Regulation must avoid duplication and inconsistency. 
6. Regulation should be co-ordinated at the international level. 
7. Regulation must be transparent and involve meaningful input from relevant 
stakeholders. 
8. Regulations need to be regularly and systematically reviewed. 
9. There must be an adequate number of regulatory staff with sufficient training and 
expertise. 
10. The choice of regulatory instrument is critical. 
In order for Canada to remain competitive, it is apparent that attention should be paid 
to these principles with respect to regulatory reform [208]. A well-developed public 
consultation process within the regulatory framework can build trust and support among 
the relevant stakeholders and work to support the legitimacy of the process, thereby 
increasing social acceptance of a project. Specific recommendations to support regulatory 
reform with respect to energy development projects include full-cost accounting and 
strategic and regional environmental assessment approaches. 
4.3.3.1. Full-Cost Accounting
A lack of understanding of the true costs and benefits of energy development projects 
is often stakeholders’ primary concern. Regulatory processes that incorporate full-
cost accounting where the social, environmental and economic costs and benefits are 
determined through third-party verification may provide an alternative regulatory approach 
[228]. This approach may provide a mechanism as well for addressing broader issues such 
as climate change impacts. On a smaller scale, local externalities can be addressed through 
this process as well. Full-cost accounting addresses the broader issue of sustainability, 
given its likeness to the concept of triple-bottom-line [247].
4.3.3.2. Strategic Environmental Assessments
Strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) provide an option for addressing broader 
regional issues that might emerge in energy development projects. SEAs are viewed as 
a mechanism to shift the regulatory approach from policy-making to policy application 
[166]. The SEA is “intended to ensure positive contributions to sustainability, as well as 
mitigation of adverse environmental effects; to enhance the openness and credibility of 
strategic level decision-making; to provide earlier, clearer and more reliable guidance for 
the planning and approval of particular projects and other subsequent undertakings; and 
to improve the overall efficiency and fairness as well as the effective quality of decision-
making” [110]. The province of Nova Scotia used the SEA process to guide the development 
of the regulatory process with respect to tidal energy development [212].
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4.3.3.3. Other Alternative Methods
Other alternatives to energy development regulation include self-regulation [139]. This 
approach offers greater flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances. Supporting 
this process might be the development of industry codes of practice, industry-based 
accreditation, and voluntary adoption of industry standards [139]. In the context of energy 
development and issues related to social acceptance, this might prove an unpopular 
approach unless significant monitoring and punitive measures are put in place. Perhaps 
companies with a proven track record and an internal monitoring system could have their 
projects fast-tracked through a self-regulatory process. 
Other suggestions for alternative regulatory frameworks include developing regulations 
and limitations (similar to posting a speed limit) that offer proactive limitations on energy 
project development. Also, review times could be cut for projects where a similar type has 
already been approved. Reframing regulatory processes based on the size and classification 
of the energy project might prove useful as well. The Council of the Federation addressed 
how regulatory processes can be improved and support social licence by enhancing 
citizens’, stakeholders’ and investors’ understanding of the approaches to developing energy 
in an environmentally sustainable manner.121
Ultimately, government and industry must review the current regulatory frameworks 
supporting energy development and determine what changes, if any, are necessary to 
address the growing discourse on social licence and energy development in Canada. Any 
alternative approach to energy development regulation requiring less public participation 
is, however, unrealistic as benefits gained in this regard would likely increase costs in other 
areas [139]. 
4.3.4. Outreach and Regulation
Supporting legitimacy and credibility of energy development projects and overall efforts 
towards social acceptance requires public consultation processes that are initiated early 
in the development process and that are ongoing through the entire phase of a project. In 
most instances, stakeholders are consulted in order to get buy-in for a project, but once 
this occurs, ongoing stakeholder consultation is limited. Budgets for stakeholder and 
community consultation typically reflect this pattern as well. Prior to stakeholder and public 
outreach, it is important to identify the relevant stakeholders. 
4.3.4.1. Stakeholder Identification
A critical factor in developing public participation processes is stakeholder identification. 
With respect to energy development projects or most large industrial projects, identifying 
stakeholders can be difficult. Regulators are placed in a difficult position because they need 
to determine whether a body has standing and how much weight should be given to that 
person’s or group’s position in terms of influence on the decision. Can anyone become a 
stakeholder who has an opinion on an energy project? Or should stakeholders be only those 
121 [58] Council of the Federation, “Canadian Energy Strategy: Progress Report…,” July 2013.
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directly affected by the project? Questions to consider in identifying stakeholders include:122
• Who is investing in the development?
• Who will the development affect, either positively or negatively?
• What are the changes the development will bring and who supports or opposes such 
changes?
• What are the official posts in the area of the development and who holds them?
• Who is influential in the local community?
• Who are the representatives of local organizations with environmental or social 
interests?
• Who are the representatives of local organizations with economic interests?
• Who are the representatives of similar (if any) developments in the area, such as 
existing offshore wind farms?
• Was there anybody involved in similar issues in the past?
• Who are the local policy-makers?
• Who are the representatives of the local/regional research community?
• Who else should be involved?
Impact zoning might be a useful mechanism to identify stakeholders as well [189]. This 
process has the project proponent identifying the broad project components and assessing 
their likely social and environmental impacts. These are then mapped. Once the impacts 
and zones are identified as well as key stakeholder groups, then overlaying these groups 
over the impact zones provides insight into who is impacted and to what extent. This 
process has proven successful in identifying stakeholders and their key concerns early in 
the development process. 
4.3.4.2. Methods for Engaging Stakeholders
Building trust, legitimacy and credibility requires careful planning of the public 
consultation process. Key issues to consider are the extent of control developers and 
regulators have over the consultation process and to what degree this influences the 
direction of communication, the tone and topics of discussion [237]. The following table 
highlights traditional methods for stakeholder consultation that take these issues into 
consideration.
122 [31] British Wind Energy Association, “Best Practices Guidelines: Consultation for Offshore Wind Energy Developments,” 
2002.
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TABLE 8 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION METHODS (TRADITIONAL)
Method Description Directionality Public Input Source
Public Exhibition  
(Information Sessions,  
Roadshows, etc.)
Proponent organizes a display or presen-
tation about the project, in a community 
space, and answers questions from the 
attending public.
Primarily unidirectional;  
sometimes limited  
bidirectional feedback.
Usually low [242] Royal (2008)
[14] Barnett et al. (2012)
Workshops Proponent and local stakeholders meet 
to discuss project plans, details, and 
possible approaches/improvements in 
depth. Early phase process.
Bidirectional;  
dialogue between proponents,  
regulators, and local people.
Usually high [242] Royal (2008)
[14] Barnett et al. (2012)
Community Forums Similar to public exhibitions, but  
focused on informing key stakeholders 
within community.
Limited bidirectional; focus on  
proponent assessing concerns  
of key actors.
Moderate [242] Royal (2008)
Opinion Research Mail, online or phone-based survey to 
ascertain public opinion about a given 
technology or proposed development 
project.
Unidirectional; information provided  
to pollster by public.
Moderate* [242] Royal (2008)
[255] Student Energy (2015)
Media Outreach Advertisements, interview appearances, 
etc. in the mainstream media.
Unidirectional; 
 media as mediator between  
proponent and public.
Little to none [242] Royal (2008)
[254] Stokes (2013)
[94] Fast & Mabee (2015)
*  In the case of opinion research, although the public is invited to share its views, the proponent frequently maintains 
control of the questions posed to the public in the survey process. Thus, the questions asked can be limited, and the 
extent of opposition may be masked, or nuances of opinion lost. As a result, opinion research is assigned a moderate 
rating for the extent of public input, because proponents have the ability to filter their questions so as to limit the ability 
to voice opposition to a project.
Traditional forms of stakeholder and public engagement have received mixed reviews and 
have come under scrutiny from many stakeholder groups as the developers and regulators 
exert too much control over the process and outcomes. Other more innovative methods 
of engagement have included strategic environmental assessments and deliberative 
consultation. These methods have been put into practice in Nova Scotia addressing, for 
example, tidal energy development in the Bay of Fundy and wind farm policy development. 
The following table outlines these innovative stakeholder engagement techniques and 
provides insight into more innovative methods for engaging stakeholders in energy 
development discussions. 
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TABLE 9 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION METHODS (INNOVATIVE)




High-level planning exercise, carried 
out by a government body designed 
to assess available resources, 
environmental impacts of harnessing the 
resource, & public concerns regarding 
utilizing that resource.
Fully bidirectional; government, experts, 
scientists, public & energy companies all 
invited to share their perspectives  
and concerns.
Usually high* [259] Tarr (2010) 
[212] Oldrieve (2013)
The Energy Walk A novel, audio-guided hike through the 
town of Hanstholm, Denmark, designed 
to educate participants on novel 
renewable energy technologies & their 
place in the landscape.
Mostly unidirectional; members of the 
public listen to the provided audio guide 
while walking; during research phase, 
public was given chance to provide 
feedback.




Process in which all stakeholders  
are brought together to discuss  
potential options for development or 
policy, guided by a neutral third party; 
goal is consensus-based planning & 
decision-making.
Fully bidirectional; all stakeholders have 
a voice in deliberations, & consensus-
as-goal means groups must discuss 
things openly; concessions & agreements 
common.
High [1] Adams et al. (2011)
IT-based Approaches Take advantage of new technologies  
to enable local people to provide 
feedback & help planning processes;  
e.g., through the use of GIS markers  
to help plan wind farms.
Bidirectional; developer can provide 
plans & criteria, public can provide 
feedback, alternatives & suggestions.
High [141] Higgs et al. (2008)
Ethnography Carry out intensive studies of local 
perceptions of place, technology 
& environment to design locally 
appropriate solutions to energy issues.
Mostly unidirectional; embedded 
ethnographer gathers information  
from & learns about the community  
to provide that information to planners 
& developers.
High [280] Watts (2009)
[281] Watts (2014)
*  Note that this is based on best practice; a poorly executed strategic environmental assessment may have very little 
capacity for incorporating public opinion into the planning process the SEA is designed to inform.
Working toward social acceptance of an energy development project requires due diligence 
to stakeholder and public consultation. Developers and regulators must identify the goals 
of consultation early in the project and build processes to support these goals. If the goals 
are to build social licence, then ultimately the engagement process must focus on strategies 
to build trust, legitimacy and credibility. Processes that provide communication between 
and among project proponents and other stakeholders are essential. As well, developers 
and regulators must understand and be willing to provide some control to stakeholders. 
Processes that lack meaningful opportunities for dialogue and provide little if any 
stakeholder control over the outcomes of a project will likely be delayed in the current 
context of energy development in Canada. 
4.3.5.  Where Does the Responsibility for Improvement Lie — Regulator or 
Proponent?
Accommodating social licence should be the responsibility of both the regulator and the 
energy project component. Considering where responsibility lies requires an understanding 
of key partners in the regulatory process and their key concerns. 
4.3.5.1. First Nations
To support the development of social licence in energy projects that involve First Nation 
communities (and most projects do), consultation should start at the earliest part of the 
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process (as there is a duty to consult, as outlined in section 3.3 above). In fact, First 
Nation consultation is not part of the regulatory process; rather, the regulatory process 
triggers it. The Crown cannot delegate its responsibility to industry regarding First Nation 
consultation. Industry can and should be involved in discussions with First Nation groups 
potentially affected by energy development projects, but this does not replace consultation 
by government. 
4.3.5.2. Industry
Companies should play a role in holding each other accountable. This should not replace 
regulatory processes and government, but serve to strengthen the system. Often, industry 
has information not accessible to government that can serve to strengthen the regulatory 
process and social licence. The addition of a whistle-blowing mechanism or ethics hotline 
should be developed for people within industry who have seen or heard something that 
needs to be reported. Often, in these cases there is no avenue for people to report on their 
own companies for fear of losing their jobs if they speak up.
A robust compliance system that could support social licence, including within the 
company, a framework for tracking post-approval attendance to possible concerns, is an 
option to explore. A robust compliance system could track annual reports (e.g., on state of 
the environment) covering:
• Disposition approvals issued;
• Compliance — warnings, court cases, orders, penalties;
• Reclamation certificates;
• Abandoned and suspended operations;
• Economic revenue generator;
• Royalties — forestry, aggregate, hydroelectric; 
• Impacts to trapping, fishing, hunting.
4.3.5.3. The Public
Nova Scotia’s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Tidal Energy Development 
– Bay of Fundy provides an example on how to engage local stakeholders in informing 
the regulatory process. In 2008, the Offshore Energy Research Association (OERA) 
commissioned the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Tidal Energy 
Development – Bay of Fundy. The purpose of this report was to prepare a state-of-
knowledge review of known environmental and socio-economic issues with respect to 
tidal energy development in the Bay of Fundy. In addition, following the development of 
the initial phase of the report, six public meetings were held in Bay of Fundy communities 
where findings were shared with stakeholders and their perspectives on tidal energy 
development in the Bay of Fundy were gathered in a community consultation report. 
Supporting participation of stakeholders was a research and participation fund set 
aside for them. Community consultation meetings were structured as consultation and 
information-sharing sessions where stakeholders were encouraged to express their concerns 
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related to tidal energy development. The outcomes of the SEA process resulted in 29 
recommendations to guide the development of tidal energy in Nova Scotia. Examples of 
recommendations include the adaptation of sustainability principles, a Mi’kmaq ecological 
study, an incremental development approach, public education and awareness, relevant 
legislation to guide tidal energy development, and community participation and benefits. 
These recommendations were revisited in 2013 with a Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) for Tidal Energy Development — Bay of Fundy Update. Since that period, Nova 
Scotia has developed a marine energy strategy to guide development and the regulatory 
process. 
With the SEA, stakeholders were presented with the most recent scientific evidence 
on the potential impacts of tidal energy development, provided funds, if requested, to 
enhance their participation, and then asked to comment on how this type of energy 
development should progress in the province with respect to regulation. Many of the 29 
recommendations were based largely on input from stakeholder consultation. Some of these 
recommendations have been noted previously, but it is important to highlight some of these 
again as they represent factors that work toward building public acceptance. These include:
• Development of tidal energy should advance incrementally using the precautionary 
principle;
• Ensure community participation and benefits;
• Develop sustainability principles to guide development of tidal energy;




To situate our discussion of social licence in a broader context, it is helpful to appreciate 
the historical perspective. During much of the 20th century, the regulation of energy 
followed the overarching trajectories of societal views on the proper role of government. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s represented to many the ultimate market failure, as 
markets, left to their own devices, were unable to provide sufficient employment. During 
the ensuing decades, the political pendulum swung to the left with ever-increasing roles for 
governments at various levels, including in energy industries.
However, the stagflation of the 1970s constituted a major government failure 
— macroeconomic policies could not resolve the twin scourges of inflation and 
unemployment, which had been exacerbated by oil price shocks. This was not entirely, 
or perhaps even primarily, a failure of macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policy. 
Regulatory burden had risen dramatically over the preceding decades, to the point where 
many industries were highly regulated. Growing evidence that regulation and government 
intervention had over-reached resulted in calls for reducing government’s role. The political 
pendulum began to swing to the right with the elections of Margaret Thatcher, then Ronald 
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Reagan, and still later, Brian Mulroney. Various industries experienced deregulation, 
some with stunning success — for example, the telecommunications industry. There was 
increased reliance on market forces and privatization. The economic growth experienced 
in the following decades was very much related to the deregulation that had occurred. The 
success in telecommunications was followed by impressive growth in other industries. 
In areas where regulation continued to be required, forward-thinking regulators shifted 
from comprehensive approaches to light-handed variants: “competition where possible, 
regulation where necessary,” as it were. In energy, the traditional cost-of-service regulatory 
model shifted to incentive regulation, the most common variant of the latter being price-cap 
regulation.
The verdict of the 20th century ideological drama that pitted societies based on market 
models against those based on central planning came out unequivocally in favour of 
the former. Liberalization, marketization and privatization were not limited to Western 
democracies. China’s strong growth in this century can be traced to modest liberalization 
policies begun in the late 1970s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in a shift to 
market economics and multi-party democracy in a number of the previous Soviet satellites 
and republics. Certain South American countries also engaged the deregulation agenda, 
with varying degrees of success. This period of deregulation in less-developed economies 
led not only to growth, but by many measures, to a reduction in global inequality as 
hundreds of millions were lifted out of the most extreme forms of poverty. 
The fundamental message of this competition of ideas was that market deficiencies merited 
correction and not replacement with bureaucratic central planning. 
By the 21st century, it appeared that in some areas, deregulation had gone too far. The 
failure of Enron in 2001 was small in comparison to the financial precipice of 2008, 
although Canada’s conservative approach to banking regulation allowed it to weather this 
period relatively uneventfully. 
Today, energy industries face what some have argued is the ultimate market failure 
— the externalities caused by the combustion of hydrocarbons, which are the source of 
about 80 per cent of energy world-wide. (In Canada, because of our vast endowments of 
hydroelectric power, hydrocarbons comprise a somewhat smaller share of the energy we 
consume.) De-carbonization has become an increasingly prominent objective of policy-
makers, often with greater rather than lesser reliance on market forces. Cap-and-trade is 
an especially salient example whereby property rights in the form of emission permits are 
created and traded to reduce the costs of de-carbonization. 
There is a risk that the financial meltdown and climate-related imperatives may lead to a 
new era of increasing regulation. This path would ignore the lessons of the previous century 
— regulation may be required, but it should be relied upon where it is necessary, and 
implemented in sensible ways. 
It is against this historical backdrop that one needs to evaluate social licence. 
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5.2. The Energy Trilemma Revisited
Early in this document, we set out the three key apexes of the energy trilemma, viz., that in 
arriving at policies and decisions, decision-makers evaluate the economic, environmental 
and security consequences of a particular path, balancing considerations in each area 
against the others. 
Economic considerations, at a minimum, involve a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
whether the proposed project makes sense from a financial perspective. There are also often 
broader economic issues to be considered, for example, whether the project is likely to 
promote economic growth and net job creation.
Environmental considerations vary based on the project and they can be local, regional or 
national. For example, wind farms may have an adverse impact on local inhabitants, but 
relative to hydrocarbon electricity generation provide a clean and carbon-free supply of 
energy which benefits all. We will return in greater detail to environmental issues below.
Security considerations, in the first instance, usually refer to a reliable supply of energy, 
availability of infrastructure and protection thereof. However, energy security can also play 
an important role in promoting national security. Just as many argue that Canada has a 
responsibility to do its share in mitigating climate change and alleviating global poverty, it 
could also be argued that it has a duty to protect the ideals of liberal democracy upon which 
it is founded, and to support allies and similarly minded nascent democratic movements.
There are also interactions among the three elements of the trilemma. Access to energy 
promotes economic growth and prosperity. Economic strength has been, and continues 
to be, essential to maintaining national security. Today, climate change itself is seen 
increasingly as a security issue, especially if changing local climates lead to droughts, food 
and water shortages, or rising sea levels lead to flooding of heavily populated regions with 
consequent migration of peoples.
Once a certain level of economic prosperity is achieved, increased attention is devoted 
to environmental matters — the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve. A country that 
finds it difficult to meet its population’s basic needs is not likely to devote major resources 
to switching from relatively cheap coal to more expensive but cleaner fuels, such as natural 
gas or renewables. Even advanced economies struggle to balance environmental goals 
against the economic needs and desires of their populations. 
5.3. Subsidiarity and Separation
The principle of subsidiarity states that decisions should be made, and tasks should be 
performed, at the lowest level in a hierarchy at which they can be competently decided and 
effected. One of the implications is that governments should undertake responsibilities 
only if individuals, groups of individuals or organizations (such as firms) cannot fulfil them 
competently on their own. The principle generally favours decentralization. It is helpful in 
illuminating lines between private and public spheres, it provides a rationale for markets  
(as opposed to central planning), it is helpful in establishing regulatory boundaries, and it 
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is useful for allocating responsibilities across local, provincial and federal governments. A 
related idea, that of clear definition and separation of responsibilities as between regulatory 
agencies and political entities, is also helpful. 
In discussions of energy issues, these two ideas — subsidiarity and separation — have 
many implications. Their relevance to the discussion of social licence can be illustrated by 
the following examples, siting of wind farms and siting of natural gas generation. 
Siting of wind farms: In 2009, Ontario embarked on an ambitious renewable energy 
program. Feed-in tariffs were established for wind and solar generation, as well as for 
other forms of renewable energy. The generosity of the tariffs elicited a very strong supply 
response — within a year, proposals totalled 15,000 MW, more than half of Ontario’s peak 
load. The province proceeded with siting approvals without sufficient consultation at local 
levels. This heavy-handed, top-down approach led to significant pushback. A preferable 
approach would have been to allow local governments and communities to make decisions 
about siting, perhaps with some form of compensation to affected parties. Given the volume 
of applications and the range of geographical options, (admittedly constrained by the spatial 
configuration of Ontario’s transmission and distribution networks), the objectives of the 
program would likely have been achieved with lower political friction and greater societal 
benefit, had siting choices been made at lower levels in the hierarchy. 
Siting of natural gas generation: In the face of aging facilities, retirement of coal-fired 
generation and the need for peaking plants, Ontario put forth a plan to develop gas-fired 
generators at various locations around the province. However, shortly before an election, 
and after considerable pressure from certain affected communities, the government decided 
to cancel two plants which were to be located in Toronto suburbs. The reversal would cost 
Ontario ratepayers hundreds of millions of dollars. How could this misadventure have been 
avoided? In this case, the key is separation of political decisions from regulatory ones; that 
is, an arm’s-length relationship between politicians and the regulator, with the latter having 
the power and authority to effect its decisions. Consider two stylized scenarios. 
In the first, there exist no reasonable alternatives to siting gas generators in Toronto 
suburbs. In this case, the government will be less tempted to make a politically motivated 
last-minute cancellation decision because it cannot be blamed for it. The regulator will take 
the heat, as it were. 
In the second scenario, there are reasonable alternative siting locations. In this case, the 
regulator hears representations from the various communities to determine which would be 
more amenable to accepting the facility, which might bring associated benefits, such as job 
creation.
Under each scenario, it may be necessary for the regulator to seek allowances or support 
from the government if some sort of direct or indirect compensation is necessary to realize 
the plans. 
In both of the above examples — siting of wind farms and of gas generators — trust and 
confidence in the decision-making process were undermined. However, the creation of  
a new and vague requirement, such as social licence, would likely further politicize the 
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decision process in a detrimental fashion. The more efficacious solution would seem to 
be to endow the regulator with the authority to make and effect decisions without the 
unpredictability and partisanship of political intervention. 
The implication of subsidiarity is that policy should be set by politicians, for 
implementation by regulators in consultation with market participants and affected parties. 
Political entities are qualified to set broad policy directions for energy industries. However, 
regulatory agencies with staff that have worked in the industry over extended periods of 
time are much more qualified to make implementation decisions. 
The thrust of these arguments is that public trust and confidence can be enhanced by 
rationalizing existing regulatory vehicles to reduce the common perception (not unrelated 
to reality) that decisions are sometimes politically motivated (i.e., separation) and ensuring 
that decisions are made at the right levels (i.e., subsidiarity). 
5.4. Equity and Efficiency
It is a fundamental tenet of economics that pricing mechanisms that reflect underlying 
costs lead to rational, socially optimal allocations of resources. Relatively efficient markets, 
with limited price distortions are socially desirable. Well-functioning markets also require 
sustained investment in capital assets, and in research and development to drive innovation. 
Predictable government policy, an efficient and efficacious regulatory process, and simple 
protections that allow firms to conduct their business without undue obstruction, are all 
important contributory elements to economic efficiency and prosperity. 
At the same time, new energy projects and more broadly, changes in regulatory and 
governmental policies, with few exceptions, have differential impacts across various 
segments of the population. They are rarely Pareto-improving. In most circumstances, 
there are individuals and groups who are adversely affected. How does one deal with these 
distributional impacts? 
Conceptually, it is important to separate economic productivity and efficiency from 
distributional consequences. While suitable compensation may be appropriate for affected 
parties, one wants to achieve this with minimum price distortion or impact on productivity. 
Mitigation of impacts is often a complex and delicate matter, and may involve political 
compromise. 
In this context, what are the implications for the institutionalization of social licence? First, 
there are likely to be increased incentives for rent-seeking behaviour. The threat of veto, 
or even obstruction, endows the affected group with leverage that can result in extraction 
of rents that are disproportionate to impacts. Second, a requirement of social licence 
increases regulatory and political uncertainty associated with a given project, discouraging 
investment, or requiring returns higher than are merited by the inherent riskiness of the 
proposed undertaking. In this case, prices in capital markets are distorted.
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND REGULATORS
Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in the world. It is also hugely varied 
geographically, with different regions having very different energy sources, as well as 
somewhat different uses for energy. For major energy infrastructure projects that involve 
a single province, let alone more than one province, achieving regional, provincial and 
aboriginal agreements and commitments to action is critical — yet is often very difficult.123
As we have seen from this paper, the legitimacy of the process, and public trust in it, 
are key elements in moving projects forward. Public perception of this legitimacy seems 
eroded based on criticism that the regulatory process has not adequately addressed certain 
environmental concerns (including climate change) or Aboriginal rights. (No process will 
solve all concerns to everyone’s satisfaction — the goal of the process is to balance the 
various economic, environmental and social issues at hand. However, to be legitimate, this 
paper suggests that the process needs to be better at including these additional concerns as 
part of the larger process). 
In addition, although the law on jurisdiction for such projects is straightforward, political 
willingness to enforce it is needed. In a democracy such as ours, leadership that helps 
achieve consensus is far more effective, particularly in the long run, than force. To this end, 
the provinces, territories and Aboriginal communities must be involved in the discussion 
of how to improve the regulatory process and the level and type of engagement in order 
to ensure trust in the process by their respective constituencies. It is important that all 
participants — the provinces and territories, their political leadership, and Aboriginal 
communities not otherwise represented by the provinces and territories — trust the national 
and provincial regulatory processes. After all, although the process is to determine if 
projects are in the national or provincial interest, they have various effects on communities 
in the various provincial, territorial and aboriginal jurisdictions, for which those local 
governments are responsible.
6.1. Governmental Co-ordination
Greater co-ordination of regulatory processes between the federal and provincial 
governments is required and should be directed towards enhancing beneficial outcomes for 
all affected stakeholders. 
The recent agreement by the provinces and territories on a Canadian Energy Strategy 
(CES) is a start. Although much of the language is vague and aspirational, as opposed to 
providing for concrete action, there is more consensus than before, including, among other 
123 Technically, the law is relatively straightforward: As long as an activity remains wholly within a province (subject to a 
few key exceptions), that province is responsible for applicable regulation, taxation and the like. Once any of the project’s 
activities cross provincial borders, however, such as transportation via pipeline or rail to reach other markets, it comes 
under federal jurisdiction. Under the constitution, the federal government has jurisdiction over “Works and Undertakings 
connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province” (BNA 
Act, s.92.10(a)) and “such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution 
declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the 
Provinces.” (BNA Act, s.92.10(c)). The federal government is also responsible for trade and commerce, and the courts have 
confirmed that this includes both international trade and interprovincial trade. Technically, no province can prevent another 
from carrying commodities to export markets by preventing transit.
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things, confirming the need for more oil pipelines and other energy infrastructure, and 
committing to cutting regulatory red tape so projects can be approved. Importantly, the 
agreement provides for ongoing work on details. Notably, however, the federal government 
is completely absent, even though national infrastructure activities fall within federal 
jurisdiction.
The provincial and territorial governments must, under the auspices of the CES:
• Set a clear timeline for concrete decisions on details to improve the regulatory 
process, with involvement by Aboriginal communities;
• Be clear that they understand the role of the federal government and the need for the 
federal government to be at the table.
The federal government must:
• Acknowledge that it has the legal and political responsibility to move forward projects 
that are in the national interest;
• Acknowledge that it has a key role in determining what is in the national interest, but 
that input from the provinces, territories and Aboriginal communities is important;
• Announce clear policies balancing economic, environmental and social interests 
— the regulatory process should not make policy, but implement it;
• Announce an effort to review and improve, where possible, the regulatory process, 
working with the provinces and territories, using as a starting place the work being 
done under the auspices of the Canadian Energy Strategy. For this purpose, it should 
establish a non- or multi-partisan, widely respected panel to make recommendations 
for improvements to the regulatory process for major infrastructure projects, working 
with those involved with the Canadian Energy Strategy, to improve efficiency, 
transparency, inclusiveness and effectiveness in implementing what should be clear 
and well-communicated policies;
• Establish a clear timeline for conclusion of such review and to implement 
recommendations;
• Be clear that, once an improved regulatory process is implemented, it will enforce the 
resulting decisions, and that as the provinces, territories and Aboriginal communities 
were involved in such improvements, the federal government will insist that 
provincial, territorial and Aboriginal authorities enforce such decisions locally as well.
6.2. Stakeholder Engagement 
Regulators are placed in a difficult position, because they need to determine whether a body 
has standing and how much weight should be given to that entity’s position. Can anyone 
become a stakeholder who has an opinion on an energy project? Or should stakeholders be 
only those directly affected by the project? How do you determine who is affected and to 
what extent? Developing a transparent process for identifying stakeholders and providing 
a venue for stakeholders’ voices to be heard can build legitimacy in the regulatory process. 
An energy project that lacks a meaningful stakeholder engagement process can lead to 
further politicization of the process and delays in a decision. 
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A consistent, transparent and rigorous system for identifying and reaching out to 
stakeholders is essential to regulatory efficiency and efficacy. Principles and practices of 
stakeholder and community engagement should be further articulated by key regulators 
and could appear as an addendum to the Canadian Energy Strategy. The document would 
highlight key principles and processes that serve to promote social acceptance of energy 
development.
6.3. Social Licence as a Concept
When it comes to energy development, the term “social licence” needs to be further 
analyzed, and, if used, used with care. The concept originated in the mining sector as the 
“social licence to operate,” and applied uniquely to the activities of mining companies 
vis-à-vis individual projects. As the concept has migrated to the energy sector, it appears 
to have broadened in scope beyond the realm of corporate social responsibility, applying 
not only to energy companies’ activities, but to the regulatory process and even to energy 
policy frameworks in toto. In the process, its meaning has become unclear, amorphous and 
confusing, and taken to its extreme, could suggest that energy projects should not proceed 
unless every single Canadian, ENGO, industry, community, etc., supports them, a standard 
that is unlikely — if impossible — to meet in practice. Other terms such as “acceptance,” 
“support” or “public confidence” may be more appropriate in the energy sphere. Regulators, 
policy-makers and politicians should refrain from the use of these terms without a clear 
understanding of their implications.
6.4. First Nations
First Nations are rights holders and thus, different from stakeholders, such as the general 
public. First Nations rights are recognized in the Canadian constitution, and a whole 
body of law exists that sets out how governments must consult and accommodate First 
Nations people. Social licence, as it pertains to Aboriginal-Canadians, should be viewed 
as secondary or supplemental to the legal duty to be consulted and accommodated, and the 
right of consent where it applies. 
The federal and provincial governments should take ownership of this duty to consult and 
ensure that it is done in a comprehensive manner that has been set out by both domestic 
and international law. Development of consistent processes across levels of government 
around consultation will enable greater uniformity and consistency in how consultation is 
undertaken, making the process more fair and equitable. In addition, best practices from 
Aboriginal consultation and engagement could be used to improve public consultation, and 
vice versa, potentially leading to higher levels of public acceptance of energy projects.
6.5. Changes to the NEB Act
Though there is only a single court challenge to the 2012 changes to the NEB Act through 
Bill C-38, the challenge asserts the changes reduce federal environmental protection, and 
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reduce federal assessment of resource development.124 Additional changes included the 
establishment of time limits on regulatory processes and who can participate in regulatory 
hearings. These issues have been frequently raised as reasons for opposition to the 
regulatory process.
The National Energy Board, as with all regulators, must balance the efficiency, 
inclusiveness and efficacy of the review process to ensure all appropriate evidence is heard 
in a timely manner. Whether or not the changes to the NEB Act in 2012 have undermined 
the ability of the NEB to maintain this balance, the changes appear to have undermined 
the National Energy Board’s credibility, and subsequently undermined the legitimacy of 
the regulatory process.125 An independent review of the changes to the NEB Act regarding 
time to consult and the list of those who can be consulted should be undertaken to ensure 
the NEB is unconstrained in its ability to regulate appropriately and has the public's 
confidence in its mandate and decisions. As the federal government moves forward with 
its agenda to modernize the NEB, it should convene an independent committee to review 
the 2012 changes and make recommendations on changes to the NEB Act or the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act to ensure the goals of increased public confidence and trust 
are met.
6.6. Make Broader Use of Information Gained during Assessment Processes
Energy regulators such as the NEB often conduct lengthy and thorough reviews of 
the opinions of Canadians when making decisions in the public interest. However, for 
practical and statutory reasons, the scope of topics that can be considered when making 
such decisions is typically limited. For example, hearings on the siting of wind energy 
projects before Ontario’s Environmental Review Tribunal have been focused on the narrow 
questions of human health and irreversible impacts on wildlife, though some parties have 
attempted to raise other considerations. For Canadians expressing concerns that are deemed 
outside the scope of a hearing’s mandate, this can be frustrating. It also represents a lost 
governance126 opportunity to identify and consider potential root causes of opposition to 
energy projects. 
Energy regulators should consider mechanisms to report recurring concerns that are outside 
of the scope of their mandate. Bodies such as the NEB or the Environmental Review 
124 [161] J. Kennedy, M. Ignasiak, and S. Duncanson, “Alberta First Nations Challenge Constitutionality of Federal Regulatory 
Reforms,” Jan. 9, 2013, Osler Blog. 
125 
Garud et al distinguish between credibility, or “the trustworthiness ascribed to a source or finding,” and legitimacy, or “the 
acceptability of constitutive practices,” ([105] Garud, Gehman, and Karunakaran, “Boundaries, Breaches, and Bridges: The 
Case of Climategate.” Research Policy, 43(1) 2014). As they note, a finding can be credible, but based on practices that are 
considered to be illegitimate, such as conducting research without institutional review board approvals. Conversely, it is 
possible for legitimate practices to generate findings that audiences consider to lack credibility, such as the recommendation 
by the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) that most women in their 40s no longer need mammograms, 
whereas starting at age 50, they are advised to have one every two years ([271] United States Preventative Services Task 
Force. 2009. “Breast Cancer Screening”). Of course, the two constructs can interact, as when the credibility of a finding is 
impacted by the legitimacy of the practices followed.
126 Governance has multiple meanings. Here it is taken to mean a system of governing that combines both state and non-state 
actors ([34] H. Bulkeley, “Reconfiguring Environmental Governance: Towards a Politics of Scales and Networks,” Political 
Geography, 2005). Doern and Gattinger’s definition of energy regulatory governance is also helpful: “… the processes 
and structures through which regulations are developed and implemented, and the ideas and ideals underpinning decision-
making” ([77] G. B. Doern & M. Gattinger, Power Switch, 2003:13)
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Tribunal in Ontario are on the front line in engaging with Canadians’ energy concerns. 
The information gathered by these bodies can and should be utilized more broadly to help 
ensure our regulatory public participation processes speak back to policy-makers. This is 
not to say that regulators should reach beyond their statutory mandates in making decisions, 
only that recurring concerns should be highlighted and made available for policy-makers, 
industry and civil society to consider. Such information, delivered alongside an easily 
digestible summary of the rights and duties of regulators, may increase transparency and 
build trust in the activities of regulators. 
6.7. Compliance after Project Approval
Information on compliance subsequent to project approval (e.g., warnings, infractions, 
penalties, court cases, reclamation certificates and abandoned operations) should be 
available in transparent forms that are accessible by the different interested stakeholders. 
Methods for sharing and making this information public should be strengthened 
and improved. In some cases, regulators may want to consider partnering with other 
organizations in the translation and dissemination of such information.
Canada’s energy sector is regulated with both national and provincial regulators, with 
responsibility of such regulation varying between provinces. There is a need for publicly 
available, timely and relevant data relating to the compliance and post-approval status of 
projects. Stakeholders would be best served if regulators could identify and agree upon 
the required content of such data and use a common format and presentation medium so 
that data are meaningful and comprehensible and not steeped in the industry and its jargon 
and processes. Data should be placed on a government portal to increase accessibility to 
stakeholders.
6.8. Cross-Examination in Regulatory Hearings
Regulatory proceedings typically involve lengthy submissions by various stakeholders 
and intervenors, and often by various governmental entities. Evidence given and tested 
under oath adds to the credibility of the process, and may therefore contribute to public 
acceptance. Although adversarial procedures are costly in terms of time and resources, they 
serve an important purpose within which the interrogatory process and cross-examination 
are important tools. The extensiveness of permitted cross-examination, and indeed the 
entire regulatory proceeding, needs to be proportionate to the magnitude of the impacts of 
the ultimate decision.
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APPENDIX: BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
Background to the Study
This research is part of the Canadian Network for Energy Policy Research and Analysis, an 
initiative designed to address pan-Canadian energy policy issues. The Canadian Network 
for Energy Policy Research and Analysis (the Network) is a virtual and physical research 
forum based at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary. Each year, the 
Network brings together academics from across Canada, forming an expert panel (the 
Working Group) that produces a white paper on a current energy policy issue. 
The Network is managed by a program director at the School of Public Policy, and is 
supported by a post-doctoral scholar and an advisory committee. Following an advisory 
committee meeting in September 2015, where pendant energy policy topics were discussed, 
the program director selected the topic of “social licence in Canadian policy.” Soon after, 
a working group of scholars was selected from across Canada to further refine the topic, 
define the problem(s) to be answered, and determine the terms of the project. 
Approach of the Working Group
The inaugural meeting of the Working Group occurred in Toronto in November 2014. 
During this meeting, the topic of the paper was explored and further refined to explore 
the role of public acceptance and the regulatory process with respect to energy project 
development. The research question agreed upon at this point was “When it comes to 
public acceptance of energy projects, is Canada’s regulatory system broken/working?” 
In approaching the research question, the Working Group relied primarily upon extant 
research, as it was not feasible to conduct primary research within the resource and time 
constraints of the project. A loose framework for the paper was developed and further 
refined through a series of conference calls soon after the inaugural meeting. Members of 
the Working Group were assigned to various sections of the paper based on expertise and 
interest. In some cases, multiple authors contributed to sections of the paper. 
Members of the Working Group held varying opinions on the value and utility of the 
concepts of social licence, social acceptance and public acceptance. While all members did 
not agree on the value and utility of some of the key concepts underlying the paper, most 
notably the term “social licence,” there was consensus on the structure and scope of the 
paper. 
Other than three in-person meetings (Toronto, Calgary and Ottawa), the bulk of the  
business in developing the paper occurred via conference call. In these calls, key  
decisions were made regarding the structure and scope of the paper. As early drafts of  
the paper emerged, discussions centred on key edits and other suggestions necessary  
for strengthening the paper. As the first draft emerged, significant attention was paid to 
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recommendations highlighting suggestions for improving the regulatory process with 
respect to social acceptance and energy development. Conference calls were made on the 
following dates:
• Feb. 17, 2015
• March 24, 2015
• April 28, 2015
• May 20, 2015
• May 26, 2015
• June 18, 2015
• July 16, 2015
• Aug. 19, 2015
• Aug. 26, 2015
• Dec. 15, 2015
• Dec. 21, 2015
• Feb. 22, 2016
Stakeholder Workshop (Calgary) Jan. 15, 2015
A focus of the Network is engagement and open discussion on policy issues, and a key 
component in the development of the white paper was a stakeholder workshop that 
has an open dialogue around the question the Working Group addressed. Stakeholders 
were invited to attend a full-day workshop to discuss the concepts of social licence and 
public acceptance, and to comment on the Working Group’s proposed research agenda. 
Attendance at this workshop was over 50 people, including the Working Group.
Development of the Paper
Working Group members worked independently on their assigned sections of the paper. 
Through an iterative process of completing and reviewing drafts of the paper supported 
by extensive literature reviews, conducted independently by each member of the Working 
Group in support of their section, a draft of the paper emerged. Working Group members 
reviewed the emerging complete draft of the paper, providing feedback as necessary to 
the corresponding authors. A final draft for initial stakeholder review was completed in 
September 2015. Accompanying this draft were a series of key recommendations to address 
challenges related to social acceptance and the regulatory process with respect to energy 
development. These recommendations were crafted after significant Working Group 
deliberations with respect to the paper’s findings. 
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Stakeholder Conference (Ottawa) Sept. 15, 2015
A draft of the paper, entitled Energy Projects, Public Acceptance and Regulatory Systems 
in Canada: A White Paper was released for external review to key stakeholders in 
government, industry, academia and NGOs. A conference was held in Ottawa on Sept. 15, 
2015 to solicit feedback on the draft of the paper. An overview of the paper was presented 
and each of the paper’s recommendations was highlighted. Formal comments were given 
by Mr. Blaine Favel, Dr. Marie-José Fortin, Mr. Rowland Harrison (Q.C.), and Dr. Ian Lee. 
Significant discussion on the merits of the paper and its recommendations highlighted key 
strengths and weaknesses of the draft paper. Stakeholder feedback on the paper, both oral 
and written, was collected and summarized. Over 70 people attended, and approximately 
15 additional people listened in via conference call.
Peer Review
Using these inputs together with his own reading, the research director at the School of 
Public Policy provided the Working Group with a formal decision letter in November 
2015, which included his guidance on final revisions to the paper. Between January and 
March 2016, the Working Group revised the paper to address the feedback provided by 
stakeholders, further refining key issues in the paper as well as providing more clarity to 
the recommendations as necessary. 
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